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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation studies three examples of public policies having consequences other 
than those intended when the policy was passed.  They demonstrate that due to the 
interconnectedness of the economy, the intended effect of a policy is rarely the sole effect. 
The first essay examines the Texas Top 10% Plan.  This policy guarantees automatic 
admission to their state university of choice for all high school seniors who graduate in the 
top 10% of their high school class.  The essay shows evidence that households reacted 
strategically to this policy by moving to neighborhoods with lower-performing schools, 
increasing property values by 4.9 percent in those areas relative to areas with slightly better 
performing schools.  The effect is strongest among schools that were the lowest performing 
before the change in policy; and weakens as the previous performance of the school district 
increases.  These strategic reactions were influenced by the number of local schooling 
options available: areas that had fewer school choices showed no reaction to the Top 10% 
Plan. 
 The second essay examines individual differences in the effects of medical 
malpractice tort reforms on pre-trial settlement speed and settlement amounts by age and 
likely settlement size.  I focus on changes in the value of settlements for those trying to 
receive quick compensation – an understudied but very important population.  Findings of 
note include that, unlike previously assumed, losses from tort reform among infants are 
small in an asset value sense and that the prime-aged working population that are the most 
negatively affected by tort reform, losing over 50 percent of the value of their mean 
settlements post reform.  Maximum entropy quantile results show that the median expected 
settlement losses are often the most informative for policy evaluation and differ greatly from 
mean policy effects.  
The third essay uses the implementation of medical malpractice damage caps in 
several states, and a panel of private insurance claims to identify the effect of damage caps 
on the amount physicians charge to insurance companies and the amount that insurance 
companies reimburse physicians for medical services.  In most cases the amount that 
physicians charge insurers does not change, but the amount that insurers reimburse 
physicians (which is the price seen in the market) decreases.  I estimate price reductions as 
large as 14.5 percent for specific procedures. 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Unintended Consequences of  Public Policy 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 The formation of public policy through legislation is a difficult process.  Not only do 
policy makers need to come to agreements with a large number of actors who have power in 
the legislative arena, but understanding the exact effects of a given policy is a complicated 
task.  Legislation that is aimed at addressing one issue in society may have effects elsewhere 
that dampen or even reverse the gains the policy sought to acquire in the first place.  Markets 
are connected in an incredibly complicated web, and an intervention in one market can 
create incentives in a different market, changing the economic landscape in powerful ways.  
Often these unintended consequences are not even considered a possibility at the time the 
legislation is written.  The possibility of unintended consequences makes careful and 
thorough cost benefit analysis a must in any public policy intervention.  But, even the most 
careful analyst is unlikely to think of every possible incentive that could emanate from a law, 
so it is also of the utmost importance to analyze policies in retrospect, so that the impact of 
unforeseen consequences can be factored into future analysis. 
The identification of unintended effects of policy is a classic topic in economics and 
one that is at the center of this body of work.  I use the term “unintended” as a catch all for 
policies that have unforeseen impacts, as well as for policies that impact underappreciated 
populations or that have understudied results.  The three essays presented here are examples 
that help illustrate specific instances of policies carrying effects that are further in scope than 
what was originally intended by the legislation.  Though the essays range in the nature of the 
policies, they all point to the same conclusion: legislative intervention in the market is a blunt 
instrument, and one that must be handled with care. 
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The first essay examines an instance where a law aimed at correcting an inequality in 
the market for higher education creates a price distortion in the housing market.  In 1996, 
the Hopwood v. University of Texas Law School case judicially banned Texas from using race as a 
criterion in admissions decisions.  Once this ruling came into effect, minority enrollment at 
Texas state universities plummeted.  In an attempt to grant increased access to universities to 
minorities Texas passed what came to be known as the Texas Top 10% Plan, which 
guaranteed automatic admission to any state university of choice to high school seniors who 
placed in the top 10% of their graduating high school class.  The automatic admission 
guarantee included the two most competitive schools in the system, University of Texas at 
Austin, and Texas A&M.  The efficacy of the Top 10% Plan depended on the segregated 
nature of Texas School districts: though explicit segregation was and still is illegal, many 
districts had largely minority populations.  Granting instant access to universities to the top 
10% of all districts would give greater access to minorities without explicitly using 
affirmative action in admissions, which the Hopwood case ruled to be illegal. 
Policy makers did not consider that students and their parents could act strategically 
in response to the Top 10% Percent Plan, specifically in their choice of location.  If a 
student was close to the top decile of his class but did not have a strong enough application 
to get into a competitive school such as Texas A&M, then he would have a lot to gain by 
moving to a less competitive school district where his level of performance would place him 
in the top decile.  The Top 10% Plan created an unintended amenity of increased access to 
top universities in poorly performing school districts, which changed the willingness to pay 
for, and thus price of housing in those school districts.  Specifically, properties in the most 
poorly performing school districts grew on average by 4.9 percent relative to properties in 
the second most poorly performing districts.  The change in prices in the housing market 
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was far outside the intended scope of the Top 10% Plan, which was aimed at addressing 
admissions inequalities. 
The second essay studies a group that suffers as a result of medical malpractice tort 
reform.  Usually medical malpractice tort reforms are passed in response to what are termed 
malpractice crises, steep increases in the cost of malpractice insurance due to tightness in the 
medical malpractice insurance market.  Tort reforms such as caps on damages and early offer 
rules are passed in attempts to alleviate pressure on physicians by limiting the size of large 
claims with blockbuster payouts.  The decrease in claims severity (and often frequency) in 
turn lowers malpractice insurance premiums and helps to bring costs to physicians under 
control. 
The medical malpractice tort system has many dimensions.  Besides being a structure 
that incents doctors to practice with the appropriate amount of care through the negligence 
rule, it also provides patients with compensation for injuries.  Medical malpractice torts serve 
as an insurance policy against negligent adverse events.  Laws which are passed in an attempt 
to control costs for physicians also have the effect of lowering the value of these insurance 
policies.  Those who are seeking to acquire quick compensation through speedy settlement, 
or who in other words are trying to collect their insurance policy in an expedient manner 
suffer a large percentage decrease in the value of their insurance. 
On average, the value of an implicit insurance policy drops by 36 percent after the 
implementation of reforms.  However, this value reduction is not uniform across age 
cohorts.  For example, people who are in their prime working years take even larger 
reductions to the value of their implicit insurance, an average reduction of over 58 percent.  
Even more conservative estimates of the value of the implicit insurance at the median and 
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maximum entropy quintile show reductions of over 25 percent.  This consequence of 
medical malpractice reform is rarely discussed when medical malpractice laws are being 
evaluated.   
The final essay looks at an unintended consequence of policy: the pass through of 
medical malpractice costs.  As noted before, the malpractice system is meant to create 
incentives for physicians to practice appropriately through the negligence rule.  It does this 
by putting costs on physicians via the risk of suit.  But, if physicians can pass through the 
costs of malpractice risk to patients, then the system may not work very well at promoting 
the appropriate level of care. 
Historically, cost pass through has been difficult to study due to a lack of data 
covering a large number of procedures over a sizable length of time.  In the third essay I use 
one of the first such databases to study the effect of state caps on damages on the price of 
medical procedures.  I am able to show sizable price reductions in response to damage caps 
(which lower costs on physicians), and present the first evidence of cost pass through of 
medical malpractice tort reforms.  Caps on non-economic damages lower the prices of 
procedures performed by Obstetricians and Gynecologists (a high risk specialty) 
significantly.  For example, the price of vaginal delivery drops by approximately 7 percent in 
the presence of a cap. 
The most interesting part of the analysis in this essay may not be the evidence of 
price reductions, but the evidence on how the price reductions come about.  Specifically, I 
show that price reductions in response to damage caps are mainly the result of private 
insurance companies lowering the amount that they are willing to reimburse providers, 
rather than the result of providers willingly lowering the amount that they charge insurers.  
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This understanding of how prices adjust in the market will provide valuable information to 
future policy makers when dealing with the issue of medical malpractice tort reform. 
The three essays help illustrate the importance of unintended effects in policy 
making.  The nature of the economy is complex, and no matter how finely tuned a policy the 
intended effect is rarely the sole effect.  If the government is going to assert itself in the 
marketplace, then great care must be taken into understanding the full set of consequences 
to an action. 
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______________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Ranking Up by Moving Out: The Effect of  the Texas Top 
10% Plan on Property Values 
______________________________________________________ 
 
Kalena E. Cortes 
Texas A&M University 
 
Andrew I. Friedson 
Syracuse University 
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2.1 Introduction 
Texas engaged in an unforeseen large-scale experiment when it replaced the use of 
affirmative action policies in its college admissions with the Top 10% Plan admissions 
policy.  The Top 10% Plan guarantees admission into any of Texas’ public universities to all 
high school seniors who finish within the top decile of their graduating class.  This includes 
the most selective state universities: The University of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M at 
College Station.  For school districts that had poor acceptance rates to postsecondary 
institutions this admissions policy suddenly provided a valuable local amenity: improved 
access. 
In this study, we analyze the effect of the Top 10% Plan on property values.  More 
specifically, we analyze whether the change in admissions policies led to an increase of the 
value of residential homes in school districts with low-performing high schools relative to 
school districts with higher-performing high schools.  School districts with low-performing 
high schools are expected to be the areas where property values are most responsive to the 
policy change because it is at these schools where access to selective public colleges was 
improved the most.  We expect to find less reaction to the Top 10% Plan in areas with high-
quality schools: because these high schools are more likely to place their top 10% of 
graduates in highly ranked postsecondary institutions, the Top 10% Plan would do much less 
to increase access. 
Using a difference-in-differences methodology, we find that, as a consequence of the 
change in admissions policy, residential property values in the areas served by schools in the 
bottom quintile of school quality grew more rapidly relative to areas served by schools in the 
2nd quintile (second from the bottom).  We also find that the bottom quintile grew relative to 
other quintiles in the school quality distribution, although the effect attenuates further away 
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from the bottom of the distribution.  We also compare the 4th quintile with the top quintile 
and find that the growth in home values did not occur in the top end of the school quality 
distribution. 
Furthermore, we observe that changes in property values are sensitive to the number 
of schooling options locally available.  If a household is going to react strategically to the 
Top 10% Plan by moving, then moves would be easier in areas with a large number of local 
schooling options (e.g., a shorter distance to find a new school would not require finding a 
new job).  Specifically, counties with a relatively high Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
for schooling would show little to no reaction to the change in policy, whereas counties with 
a relatively low HHI for schooling would show the greatest reaction to the policy change.  
This is precisely the case: we find that the disproportionate growth of property values in the 
bottom quintile of school quality relative to the 2nd quintile did not occur in counties that 
were more monopolistic, but did occur in counties that were more competitive. 
Lastly, our analysis estimates that the Top 10% Plan had a rate of return of 4.9 
percent in relative average property value gains of the lowest quintile of school quality 
compared to the 2nd quintile of school quality.  As property values vary greatly from district 
to district before the policy shift and property tax rates also vary greatly it is easy to see how 
the Top 10% Plan had a powerful impact not only on admissions decisions, but also on 
school finance and local taxation decisions. 
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2.2 Background of the Top 10% Plan and Literature Review  
2.2.1. The Top 10% Plan 
The 5th Circuit Court’s decision in Hopwood v. University of Texas Law School 
judicially banned the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in all public 
postsecondary institutions in Texas.1  The end of affirmative action admissions policies was 
overwhelmingly felt, especially at the two most selective public institutions, The University 
of Texas at Austin and Texas A&M University at College Station, where the number of 
minority enrollees plummeted (Tienda et al. 2003; Bucks 2004; Walker and Lavergne 2001).  
In response to this ruling, Texas passed the H.B.588 Law on May 20, 1997–more commonly 
known as the Top 10% Plan.  The Top 10% Plan guarantees automatic admission to any 
public university of choice to all seniors who graduate in the top decile of their graduating 
high school class.2,3  This is similar to other states’ percent plans (e.g., California and 
Florida), but is unique in the sense that it gives students the choice of which public 
institution they would like to attend rather than assigning the institution outright.4   
Proponents of the plan believed that it would restore campus diversity because of 
the high degree of segregation among high schools in Texas.  Their logic was that the 
number of minority students who would be rank-eligible under the Top 10% Plan would be 
sufficient to restore campus diversity in the university system.  Even though the goal of the 
Top 10% Plan was to improve access for disadvantaged and minority students, the use of a 
school-specific standard to determine eligibility may have led to some unintended effects if 
                                                          
1 See Hopwood v. University of Texas Law School 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996). 
2 In 2009, Texas placed some limits on student choice: the University of Texas at Austin is now allowed to cut 
off the proportion of Top 10% Plan students in a given freshman class at 75 percent. 
3 Although private universities are duty-bound by the Hopwood ruling, they are not subject to the automatic 
admissions guarantee (Tienda et al. 2003). 
4 In both California and Florida students are accepted into the state university system by rank eligibility but are 
not given a choice of which institution they would like to attend.  
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households responded strategically.  In a recent study, Cullen, Long, and Reback (2011) find 
that a large number of students increased their chances of being in the top 10% by choosing 
a high school with lower-achieving peers.  They analyze student mobility patterns between 
the 8th and 10th grades before and after the policy change, and conclude that the change in 
admissions policies in Texas did indeed influence the high school choices of students.  This 
evidence of students changing districts strategically goes a long way towards explaining the 
changes in enrollment probabilities for minority and non-minority students found in Tienda 
et al. (2003), Bucks (2003), Walker and Lavergne (2001), Niu et al. (2006), and Cortes (2010).   
 If households are moving strategically between schools then their valuation of those 
schools must have changed due to the policy.  Our analysis pushes this idea further by 
looking for evidence of this change through households’ maximum willingness to pay for 
housing services.  This is reflected in changes in property values in school districts whose 
desirability changed when the Top 10% Plan was implemented. 
2.2.2. Related Literature 
 The Top 10% Plan changed how much certain households are willing to pay for 
school district quality through their housing prices.  This sort of reaction is best illustrated 
with bidding and sorting models, which are a part of the local public finance literature.  This 
branch of the literature is widely seen as starting with Tiebout (1956) who put forth the idea 
that households shop for property tax and public service packages through their choice of 
location, and compete for entry into communities with more desirable packages by bidding 
on housing.  This forms the cornerstone of bidding and sorting models in which different 
income and taste classes of households sort themselves based on their maximum willingness 
to pay for a quality adjusted unit of housing in communities with different tax and service 
11 
 
packages.5  Ross and Yinger (1999) provide a discussion of this class of model as well as a 
review of the capitalization literature that analyzes how differing property tax or public 
service levels are reflected in housing prices. 
 The part of this literature that is germane to our analysis deals with estimating the 
capitalization of school district characteristics.  The main empirical hurdle with these studies 
is disentangling the capitalization of school district characteristics from the capitalization of 
neighborhood characteristics and taxes because these attributes are also spatially linked.  A 
popular solution to this empirical hurdle is to use school districts that have more than one 
school in them and identify capitalization effects using variation across boundaries inside of 
the school district.  Variations on this strategy have been used by Bogart and Cromwell 
(1997), Black (1999), as well as Weimer and Wolkoff (2001). 
 Another possibility is to use panel data and difference out the undesired effects; this 
allows analysis of the capitalization of school district characteristics that vary over time.  
Barrow and Rouse (2004) use school district fixed effects to see how differences in state aid 
to schools are capitalized into property values.  Their identification strategy is similar to 
Clapp, Nanda and Ross (2008) who use census tract fixed effects to study the capitalization 
of differences in state standardized test scores and school district demographics over time.  
Also, a study by Figlio and Lucas (2004) uses repeat sales data, which allows for property 
level fixed effects, to look at the effect of school report card grades on property values. 
 Our identification strategy is closer to the second set of papers: we tackle 
neighborhood and tax effects by differencing over time as part of our difference-in-
                                                          
5 Households sort along income for both property taxes and public services, but they only sort along 
preferences for public services.  This is because regardless of tastes any household is willing to pay a maximum 
of one dollar to avoid one dollar of taxes. 
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differences estimator.  However, our analysis is different in that we are not interested in the 
level of public service capitalization into property values as much as we are interested in how 
property values change in response to a policy shift.  There are not a lot of studies that take 
such an approach, the only paper that we are aware of is by Reback (2005), who analyzes 
how property values respond to the introduction of a school choice program in Minnesota. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework:  The Effect of the Top 10% Plan on 
Property Values 
This section presents the conceptual model that sheds light on our identification 
strategy.  Our hypothesis is that after the implementation of the Top 10% Plan property 
values will increase in lower-quality school districts relative to higher-quality school districts.  
To explain why we expect this to be the case we will briefly introduce a model of bidding 
and sorting.  Following Ross and Yinger (1999), we make the following assumptions:6 
(A.1) Household utility depends on consumption of housing, public services (in our 
case school district quality), and a composite good.  Furthermore we will assume 
that the households utility function takes on a Cobb-Douglas functional form, 
this will make the specific effect of the Top 10% Plan easier to see algebraically. 
(A.2) Every household falls into a distinct income and taste class of which there are a 
finite number. 
(A.3) Households are perfectly mobile homeowners. 
(A.4) All households in the same school district receive the same level of school 
district quality, and the only way to gain access to a school district is to reside 
within its borders.   
                                                          
6 For a complete treatment of this and similar types of bidding models as well as a review of the relevant 
bidding and sorting literature refer to Ross and Yinger (1999). 
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(A.5) There are many school districts with varying levels of quality that finance 
themselves through a local property tax. 7 
We will use the following notation: S is the level of local public services (school 
district quality), H is housing, measured in quality adjusted units of housing services with a 
price of P per unit.  Z is the composite good, with a price normalized to one.  The effective 
property tax rate is t, the total tax payment is T, which equals t times V, and the value of a 
property is given by PHV
r
= , where r is the discount rate.  T can be simplified by noticing 
that tT t V PH t PH
r
= ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ .  This yields a household budget constraint of: 
( )1Y Z PH t= + ⋅ +  . 
To capture competition for entry into desirable communities, the household utility 
maximization can be viewed as a bidding problem:  How much is a household willing to bid 
for a unit of housing in a more desirable community?  This is shown by rearranging the 
budget constraint to solve for a household’s maximum bid: 
{ } ( ),
     
1
−
=
⋅ + H Z
Y ZMax P
H t
    (1) 
   ( ) ( )0   , ; =Subject to U Z H S U Y      
Setting up the Lagrange function, the household’s optimization problem becomes 
the following: 
 { } ( )
( ) ( ){ }0
,
  L , ;
1
λ−= + ⋅ −
⋅ + H Z
Y ZMax U Z H S U Y
H t  (2)
 
                                                          
7 An alternate to this assumption is to assume a proportional tax on housing services consumed.  This is 
essentially a property tax, but does allow for the possibility of renters, allowing (A.3) to be slightly relaxed.  An 
implementation of this assumption can be found in Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1993). 
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The household’s maximization problem has the following first order conditions for 
an interior solution: 
( )2
: 0
1
λ∂ −− + ⋅ =
∂ ⋅ +  H
L Y Z U
H H t
   (3) 
( )
1: 0
1
λ∂ − + ⋅ =
∂ ⋅ +  Z
L U
Z H t
     (4) 
These results allow us to solve for the Lagrange multiplier, which will be needed later 
to get comparative statics via the envelope theorem.  There are two possible solutions for 
the Lagrange multiplier.  Using the first order condition with respect to housing, H, the 
solution is: 
 
( )2 1
λ −=
⋅ + ⋅ H
Y Z
H t U     (5)
 
And using the first order condition with respect to the composite good, Z, the 
solution is: 
 
( )
1
1
λ =
⋅ + ⋅ ZH t U
    (6) 
 These are both apt expressions for the Lagrange multiplier, λ, however, the second 
expression lends itself to ease of interpretation in the next step.  If we recognize that school 
district quality, S, is a parameter in this setup, then we can solve for the impact of S on the 
bid P by applying the envelope theorem to equation (1): 
 S SP Uλ= ⋅
    (7) 
We can then substitute in equation (6) for  λ to get, 
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( ) ( )* *
1
1 1
= ⋅ =
⋅ + ⋅ + 
S
S
Z
MBUP U H t H t    (8) 
 This is greatly simplified by our use of the second expression for λ, since S
Z
U
U   is 
the marginal benefit of a unit of S (as the price of a unit of Z has been normalized to one).  
SP  is an expression for the slope of a bid-function (i.e., maximum willingness to pay for a 
quality adjusted unit of housing) with respect to S for an arbitrary income and taste class.  If 
we notice that the value of this slope will be different for different income and taste classes 
then we can display a group of bid-functions B1, B2, and B3 as shown in Figure 2.1. 
 B1, B2, and B3 represent bid-functions for three different income and taste classes.  
Since housing is purchased by the highest bidder, the market bid-function is the upper 
envelope of the bid-functions of all income and taste classes.  To look at the theoretical 
impact of the Top 10% Plan, consider a Cobb-Douglas utility function: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ; ln ln 1 lnα β α β= ⋅ + ⋅ + − − ⋅U Z H S S Z H   
 Where 0 < α, β < 1, α + β < 1   (9) 
The Top 10% Plan makes school district quality (i.e., ACT test scores) less valuable 
to a specific income and taste class, namely households whose children would now benefit 
from having peers who perform more poorly.  This can be viewed as a decrease in the 
parameter α, which captures the household’s taste for school district quality.  Hence, we can 
find the effect of the Top 10% Plan on housing prices through a change in the parameter α 
by substituting equation (9) into equation (1) and then applying the envelope theorem: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
*
*
*
ln ln
ln ln
1α
λ
−
 = ⋅ − =  ⋅ + ⋅ Z
S H
P S H
H t U
  (10) 
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 Equation (10) is positive if S > H, negative if S < H, and zero when the two are 
equivalent.  Suppose B2 is the bid-function for the income and taste class that will be 
affected by the Top 10% Plan, then as shown in Figure 2.1, B2’ is the income and taste class 
bid function after the Top 10% Plan is enacted. 
Since S and P are both in per quality adjusted unit of housing terms, there exists 
some *S  such that there is one unit of school district quality per unit of housing.  For school 
districts with higher quality than *S  the affected income and taste class will have a smaller 
bid after the policy is enacted, and for school districts with lower quality than *S  the 
affected income and taste class will have a larger bid after the policy is enacted.  If we 
compare the upper envelope of B1, B2, and B3 to the upper envelope of B1, B2’, and B3 the 
impact of the Top 10% Plan is clear.  The two wedges to either side of *S  show the 
potential distortion in housing prices caused by the policy change.  It should be noted that 
the part of the B2’ bid function that is mapped to *S  will not necessarily be part of the 
market bid-function envelope.  This means that the part of the post-policy market bid-
function that comes from the affected income and taste class could be either greater or less 
than it was prior to the policy change.  That is, housing prices will solely increase on the 
affected portion of the bid-function if *S  is to the right of or equal to the point where B2’ 
and B3 intersect, whereas housing prices will solely decrease on the affected portion if *S  is 
to the left of or equal to the point where B2’ and B1 intersect.  Which case prevails does not 
change the qualitative result of the policy change.  The Top 10% Plan makes school districts 
of lower quality than *S  increase in value relative to those school districts of higher quality 
than *S .  Whether the relative gain is because of an increase in value for low-quality school 
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districts, a decrease in value for high-quality school districts, or some amalgam of the two is 
uncertain. 
Realistically the Top 10% Plan will influence multiple household types all at the same 
time.  This can be visualized as an overall flattening of the distribution of bid functions.  
Households that have more to gain by improved access will flatten their bid functions to a 
larger extent.  There is also some uncertainty as to the specific mechanism by which the 
property values change, but whether prices adjust because of moves within a district, across 
districts or even from out of state is immaterial to our analysis.  All that matters is that 
households change residence for some reason (possibly unrelated to the Top 10% Plan), and 
in the course of the move their new willingness to pay for housing services (that factors in 
the Top 10% Plan) will be capitalized into housing values. 
2.4 Empirical Strategies and Model Specification  
2.4.1. Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
We use a difference-in-differences analytic approach to study the effect of the Top 
10% Plan on property values.  We compare changes in home values before and after the 
Top 10% Plan was enacted by differencing property values in the pre-policy period (1994-95 
school year through 1996-97 school year) from property values in the post-policy period 
(1997-98 school year through 2005-06 school year).  This removes any effects that are 
constant between the pre and post-periods such as omitted neighborhood effects.  The 
second difference is between the 1st and 2nd quintiles of school quality.  This should yield the 
net effect of the Top 10% Plan on home values in the 1st (bottom) quintile relative to the 2nd 
quintile.  Our identification strategy hinges on the assumption that there were no other 
exogenous factors that could have caused these differences in this time frame.   
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Several models of the following form are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with interest on the parameter δ , the difference-in-differences estimator, 
( ) α γ β δ τ= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ln t i t i tjtY Post Treatment Post Treatment Ltrend  
it kt jtX Cθ λ ϕ ε+ ⋅ + ⋅ + +       (11) 
where the dependent variable ( )ln jtY  indicates the log of the average price of a single 
family home  in school district j in year t.  Postt is a binary variable indicating the period after 
the law was passed (i.e., equal to 1 for the 1997-98 through 2005-06 school years or equal to 
0 for the 1994-95 through 1996-97 school years).  Treatmenti is a binary variable indicating 
low-performing high school campuses (i.e. campuses with poor pre-policy access to 
universities), these campuses are identified by their median American College Test (ACT) 
scores (i.e., equal to 1 for the 1st ACT quintile or equal to 0 for the 2nd ACT quintile).8  Postt 
multiplied by Treatmenti is the interaction of these two indicator variables.  Ltrendt is a linear 
time trend.  itX  is a vector of time varying characteristics associated with high school i in 
year t.  ktC is a vector of time varying characteristics associated with county k in year t, and 
ϕ  is a vector of Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) fixed effects.  Lastly, jtε  is a normally 
distributed random error term. 
 More specifically, the vectors described in equation (11) contain the following 
variables: itX  is comprised of the high school demographic controls and variables for the 
degree of urbanization at the high school’s location.  The high school demographics include: 
the percentage of minority students, the percentage of economically disadvantaged students, 
                                                          
8 We can observe ACT scores on the individual high school level, but our dependent variable is measured at the 
district level.  This introduces an aggregation bias towards finding no response from the policy change. 
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the percentage of gifted students, average teacher experience, and the teacher-to-student 
ratio.  The urbanization controls are dummy variables for the school campus being located 
in a large or small city, a large or small urban fringe, or in a town.  Rural campuses are the 
omitted category. ktC is a vector of time varying county characteristics and has controls for 
the percentage of the population that is black, the percentage of the population that is 
Hispanic, the average number of persons per housing unit, the percentage of housing units 
that are owner-occupied, violent crimes per 1,000 people, and the percentage of county 
residents with a college degree. 
Our theoretical model from the previous section cannot tell us whether the relative 
price change is driven by low or high-quality school districts, and neither can the difference-
in-differences estimator.  However, the difference-in-differences estimator has some nice 
properties when faced with some highly probable types of misspecification.  Incorrect 
specification of *S  the border between the treatment and control groups will bias the 
difference-in-differences estimator towards zero.  Moreover, incorrectly specifying the 
bottom edge of the treatment group or the top edge of the control group will also bias the 
difference-in-differences estimator towards zero. 
Also, high school switching could realistically happen between any two schools of 
differential quality in the lower end of the school quality distribution.  Not all switches will 
be from the 2nd ACT quintile of school quality to the bottom ACT quintile of school quality 
– there is a possibility for intra-quintile switches.  However, if we assume that all switches 
inspired by the policy change are from higher to lower-quality schools, then failing to 
capture price changes coming from these intra-quintile switches will bias the difference-in-
differences estimation towards finding no effect from the legislative change. 
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Our estimation strategy allows us to identify effects from the part of the distribution 
of school quality that should be most responsive to the policy shift.  The astute reader will 
notice the opportunity to check other parts of the distribution for policy effects.  Specifically 
we can estimate the effect of the Top 10% Plan on all quintiles relative to the bottom 
quintile.  We would expect to see the quintiles closest to the bottom of the distribution to 
have the largest effect, and to see the effects attenuate as we look further and further away 
from the bottom quintile.  This can be done by estimating the following model specification:  
( ) α γ β δ τ= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ln t i t i tjtY Post Qtile Post Qtile Ltrend  
it kt jtX Cθ λ ϕ ε+ ⋅ + ⋅ + +     (12) 
where Qtile is a vector of dummy variables for the 2nd, 3rd, 4th and top quintiles (the bottom 
quintile is the omitted category).  The different realizations of δ , the coefficient on the 
interactions between the dummy variables and the post period indicator will give the effect 
of the policy on the different quintiles relative to the bottom quintile. 
We can also run the difference-in-differences analysis for the top two ACT quintiles 
of the school quality distribution.  High schools with top levels of academic performance 
should be placing much more than their top 10% of graduates into institutions of quality and 
as such should be largely unaffected by the implementation of the Top 10% Plan.  If in the 
top end of the school quality distribution, relatively “poor” performing school districts (4th 
ACT quintile) are gaining in property value relative to better performing school districts (5th 
ACT quintile), then our proposed mechanism for property value changes in the bottom end 
of the school quality distribution would be called into serious doubt.  Such a result would 
show that migration from higher to relatively “lower” quality school districts occurred in a 
part of the school quality distribution where the Top 10% Plan should have little to no 
21 
 
effect, making it likely that any changes observed in the bottom part of the school quality 
distribution were caused by some other phenomenon all together.  Our hypothesis will be 
greatly strengthened if there are noticeable difference-in-differences between the bottom two 
(2nd and 1st) ACT quintiles but not between the top two (5th and 4th ) ACT quintiles. 
2.4.2. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Analysis 
Our second estimation strategy investigates if the number of schooling options 
available influenced the effect of the Top 10% Plan on property values.  If it is costly to 
change school districts, which is the proposed mechanism for the property value changes, 
then it is less likely that households will react to the policy change.  Therefore, if there are 
more local schooling options then it should be less costly to change school districts and 
there should be a larger reaction.  For example, a move across the state to find a more 
strategic school seems unlikely because of the costs of finding new employment for the 
parents.  However, a move of a smaller distance such as a couple blocks seems much more 
reasonable.9 
One approach is to measure how concentrated the schooling industry is at the 
county level.  This can be done by calculating the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for 
each county, 
2
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where is  is the market share of each high school i in county k.  For schooling, a measure of 
the market share is the number of students at the high school divided by the total number of 
                                                          
9 It is not necessary for the household to move because of the policy change to get a resulting change in 
property values. A change in values may be driven by households that were already planning to move and 
simply found lower-performing schools to suddenly be more desirable. 
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students in the county.  A kHHI value close to 1 indicates a more monopolistic county, 
whereas a kHHI  value close to 0 indicates a more competitive county. 
 To analyze whether the number of schooling options available influenced the effect 
of the Top 10% Plan on property values, we interact the pre-policy county level kHHI  
measure with our difference-in-differences estimator, yielding the following triple-difference 
specification, 
( ) α γ β δ τ= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ln t i t i tjtY Post Treatment Post Treatment Ltrend  
kitkiktk HHITreatmentPostHHITreatmentHHIPostHHI ⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+ πρφψ  
 jtktit CX ηϕλθ ++⋅+⋅+      (14) 
where π  is now the parameter of interest, estimating the effect of the county kHHI  on the 
relative impact of the Top 10% Plan on property values.   
A negative value for the coefficient π  would imply that counties with less school 
choice showed a smaller reaction to the Top 10% Plan.  This coefficient will tell us if school 
choice matters, but does not give us any information as to which part of the school 
competition distribution could be driving the result.  To get at this point we split counties 
into quintiles based on their pre-policy years’ kHHI  value.  We then estimate a different-in-
differences regression (equation 11) for each kHHI  quintile separately.  This allows us to 
show how the effect of the Top 10% Plan differed for areas with different amounts of local 
schooling options in greater distributional detail by comparing difference-in-differences 
estimates for the kHHI  quintile subsamples.   
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2.5 Data Sources and Sample Characteristics 
2.5.1. Data Sources 
The data for this study was compiled from five sources: the Texas Comptroller 
Property Tax Division (TCPTD); the Academic Excellence Indicator System (AEIS) from 
the Student Assessment Divisions of the Texas Education Agency; the National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES); the U.S. Census Bureau; and lastly, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) database.  The TCPTD, AEIS, and NCES 
all utilize Independent School District unique identification numbers that are identical across 
datasets and enable the linkage of variables in each of these datasets to their specific high 
school campuses.     
The TCPTD database, contains information on total appraised home values for all 
school districts from 1994-95 to 2005-06, which covers both pre and post-policy years.  This 
value is an aggregation of all residential homes that are served by a specific school district.  
Our analysis uses property values for single family homes only.  We exclude multiple family 
dwellings and condominiums as well as all non-residential properties from our analysis.  The 
TCPTD data also has information on the number of residential housing units in each school 
district.  We use this information to construct our dependent variable by dividing the 
aggregate value of all residential homes in a school district by the number of housing units in 
that district.  All home values are normalized to 1990 dollars. 
Property appraisals in Texas follow a specific procedure.  A property must be 
reappraised by its appraisal district at least once every three years, but this can be done more 
frequently.  If a property is sold in a given year, then the sale price of the property is 
automatically used as the new appraised value of the property.  For properties that do not 
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sell, they are assigned a value based on how their characteristics compare to the 
characteristics of properties that were sold recently.  The tax assessors generate a model 
based on recent sales and then use that model to predict what the assessment should be for 
the unsold properties.   There are also limits on how much an appraisal can increase over the 
previous year’s appraisal.10  Given how Texas calculates its home appraisals our data 
accounts fairly well for property value changes as reflected by housing transactions. 
We use the AEIS data in the pre-policy years (i.e., 1994-95 through 1996-97) to 
identify low-performing high school campuses using the median American College Test 
(ACT) scores of the graduating class.  The mean of the median ACT scores in the pre-policy 
years is then used to sort campuses into quintiles.  This allows for the identification of poor-
performing schools that are most likely to be targeted by parents who chose to change 
districts in order to increase the chances of their children being rank-eligible for automatic 
admission.  While some states use the ACT as their assessment measure for the No Child 
Left Behind Act (NCLB) to hold schools accountable, this is not the case in Texas.  Texas 
has its own state assessment test, the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS).  Thus, 
using the ACT scores allows us to more reliably identify low-performing schools relative to 
higher-performing schools.11,12 
                                                          
10 An appraisal may not increase to more than the lesser of: 
a) The sale price of the property if it sold that year, or 
b) 110 percent of the previous year’s appraisal plus the market value of any new improvements on the 
property. 
11 Our analysis was also conducted using the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores and found similar results to 
that of the ACT analysis.   
12 For purposes of our analysis ACT scores are superior to TAAS scores because the TAAS unlike the ACT (or 
SAT) is not used in college admissions decisions and is not necessarily a good indicator of a school’s access to 
universities. 
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The AEIS data also contains detailed information on student and teacher 
demographic variables; this allows us to calculate the percentage of minority students, the 
percentage of economically disadvantaged students (i.e., those who qualify for reduced price 
school lunch), the percentage of students that participate in a gifted program, average 
teacher experience, and the teacher-to-student ratio at a given high school.  Our analysis is 
restricted to “regular” high schools; any alternative or magnet high schools as well as any 
juvenile delinquency centers are dropped from the analytic sample. 
The NCES data link high school campuses to the urbanization level of their 
surrounding area.  For the purposes of this study, campuses are considered to be located in a 
large city if they are in the central city of a Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(CMSA) with a population greater than 250,000.  Campuses are considered to be located in a 
small city if they are in the central city of a CMSA with a population less than 250,000.  
Campuses located in large and small fringes refer to addresses that are within the CMSAs for 
large and small cities respectively, but are not located in the central city of that CMSA.  
Campuses located in towns are in areas that are not incorporated into the above definitions 
and also have a population greater than or equal to 2,500.  All other campuses are considered 
to be located in a rural setting, which is the omitted category in our analysis. 
In addition, we use the U.S. Decennial Census and UCR data to merge in additional 
controls needed in the analysis.  We use the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Decennial Censuses to 
create county-level variables to capture the trends in the percentage of the population that is 
black, the percentage of the population that is Hispanic, the average persons per housing 
unit, and the percentage of housing units that are owner-occupied.  Lastly, the UCR database 
provides us with county-level variables on violent crimes (i.e., murder, rape, robbery, and 
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assault).13  Combining the UCR data with the Census data allows us to use estimates of the 
county-level violent crime rate for the school years of interest. 
2.5.2. Sample Characteristics 
Table 2.1 reports means and standard deviations for the variables used in our 
analysis.  It also reports the data for the relevant subsamples.  For our main specifications 
the subsample of interest is the bottom two quintiles of school quality with regards to the 
ACT score distribution.  The 1st quintile (bottom) serves as the treatment group and the 2nd 
quintile as the control group.  The 1st quintile of schools represents schools that are most 
likely to be targeted by parents seeking to take advantage of the Top 10% Plan.  The 2nd 
quintile is a good approximation for schools that a strategic parent would want to move their 
child from in order to gain the benefits available in the bottom quintile.  This is because the 
2nd quintile is most similar to the bottom quintile in terms of academic performance and pre-
policy access to selective state colleges and universities. 
It is immediately noticeable that the 1st and 2nd quintiles are actually quite different in 
many of their other characteristics.  One such characteristic is that property values are far 
greater in the bottom quintile than in the 2nd quintile.  This is largely because the bottom 
quintile contains many more large urbanized areas (34.8 percent versus 11.5 percent).  
Further evidence of this is found in Figure 2.2 that shows the time trends for the property 
values of the treatment and control groups.  The 1st and 2nd quintiles appear as if they may be 
on different growth paths in the post period.  This provides us with reason to control for 
trends in property values in our analysis.  But even without these controls, it appears at first 
glance that the 1st quintile does have a  jump in property values after the Top 10% Plan is 
                                                          
13 There are several measures of crime available in the UCR database.  We use violent crimes because they are 
largely not financially motivated and thus exogenous with respect to local property values, as opposed to an 
alternate measure of property crimes (grand theft auto, larceny, etc.), which are highly endogenous. 
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enacted on May 20th, 1997, however, less of a discernible jump in property values is observed 
for the 2nd quintile.  Figure 2.2 also indicates that prior to the implementation of the Top 
10% Plan the slopes of the treatment and control groups trend lines seem to be quite close. 
Additionally, Table 2.2 reports the differences without a linear time trend (or 
controls) for levels and logs of property values.  As seen in panel B of Table 2.2, we observe 
a 2.9 percent increase in residential home values for low-performing school districts relative 
to the second quintile after the policy change. 
2.6 Discussion of Results 
2.6.1. Overall Results: Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
The results for the regression adjusted difference-in-differences analysis are 
summarized in Table 2.3.  This table only reports the estimated coefficients on the post 
indicator variable interacted with the treatment indicator variable, treatment indicator, post 
indicator, and the linear time trend.  The layout of Table 2.3 is as follows: column (1) 
presents the unadjusted baseline effects, column (2) controls for high school demographics 
and urbanization characteristics, column (3) is the fully controlled regression specification 
(i.e., high school characteristics, urbanization characteristics, and county level controls), and 
lastly, column (4) is the fully controlled regression specification with the addition of MSA 
fixed effects. 
There is a positive and statistically significant difference-in-differences estimate for 
all model specifications.  The point estimate on the difference-in-differences estimator 
ranges between 0.032 and 0.051.14  Our preferred specification (shown in column (4)), 
estimates a 4.9 percent increase of housing prices in low-performing school districts.  This 
                                                          
14  Similar results were found using median pre-policy ACT scores (as opposed to the mean). 
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lends credence to our hypothesis of the Top 10% Plan influencing property values in the 
lower end of the school quality distribution.  Specifically, this suggests that the benefit 
offered by the increased likelihood of college admissions from attending a lower-quality 
school has caused property values in the bottom quintile to increase in value relative to those 
in the 2nd quintile.  Though the magnitudes of the point estimates do vary, the directions of 
these estimates are not sensitive and are fairly robust to the addition of controls and MSA 
fixed effects.  Our point estimates are comparable in size to effects found in other studies 
looking at the capitalization of schooling attributes.  Our results are larger than the estimated 
effect on property values of a one standard deviation increase in test scores of around 1 
percent as found in studies such as Clapp, Nanda and Ross (2008) and Black (1999); but 
smaller than the 7 percent effect found by Figlio and Lucas (2004) for top marks on school 
report card grades.  Reback (2005), whose methodology is closest to our own, finds around a 
2 percent effect for gaining access to a high school choice program. 
As for the point estimates on the control variables for property values, the point 
estimate on percent of minority students is positive.  This is not surprising as this variable is 
negatively correlated with the variable for percent of economically disadvantaged students.  
Property values also appear to be positively related to schools with more students in gifted 
programs and a higher teacher-to-student ratio.  The urbanization controls all have positive 
point estimates that increase in magnitude as the school’s location increase in population 
size.  This is consistent with the standard urban economics result of higher land prices in 
more urbanized areas.  Lastly, county education level has a positive and significant effect on 
property values.15 
                                                          
15 Full regression results are available upon request. 
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Analysis of Other Parts of the School Quality Distribution 
 The results for the entire distribution of school quality relative to the bottom of the 
distribution are presented in Table 2.4.  Table 2.4 has the same table layout as Table 2.3.  
The negative point estimates for the interaction terms indicate that the quintile in question is 
losing value relative to the bottom quintile.  Or, the bottom quintile is gaining relative to the 
quintile in question.  Table 2.4 shows a clear story for the distribution of school quality: the 
effect of the Top 10% Plan is strongest in the quintiles closer to the bottom of the 
distribution and attenuates with distance.   
Lastly, the results from the placebo difference-in-differences regression analysis are 
summarized in Table 2.5.  The placebo analysis uses the top two quintiles of school quality 
instead of the bottom two quintiles.  The placebo treatment group is thus the 4th quintile and 
the placebo control group is the 5th quintile.  The most important result in Table 2.5 is that 
all of the difference-in-differences point estimates are either negative or statistically 
insignificant.  This is not the effect that one would expect to see if the Top 10% Plan had 
caused strategic high school switching in the top of the school quality distribution.   
Taken all together, our results suggests that the benefit offered by the increased 
likelihood of college admissions from attending a lower-quality school caused property 
values in the bottom quintile to increase in value relative to those in the 2nd quintile.  Thus, 
the Top 10% Plan makes school district quality less valuable to a specific income and taste 
class, namely households whose children would now benefit from having peers who perform 
more poorly. 
30 
 
2.6.2. Robustness Analysis  
It is possible that our findings could be the result of events other than the 
implementation of the Top 10% Plan.  In fact, the time period around the implementation 
of the Top 10% Plan contains many policy changes in Texas that also affect schooling.  
These changes could serve as alternative explanations that would invalidate the interpretation 
of our difference-in-differences estimates.  In this section, we present additional analyses 
that rule out these policy changes as alternatives to our interpretation.   
2.6.2.1. Pre-existing Trends 
A concern that arises when conducting a difference-in-differences analysis is that the 
treatment and control groups are on different growth paths before the policy is enacted.  In 
order for our previous analysis to provide unbiased estimates of the effect of the Top 10% 
Plan, it must be the case that the treatment and control groups exhibit common trends in the 
pre-policy period.  This assumption in the difference-in-differences framework is commonly 
known as the parallel-trends assumption.  Even though we use a linear time trend in our 
analysis it is still a possibility that the treatment and control groups are on different growth 
paths even after this inclusion.  Figure 2.2 suggests that this assumption holds for our 
analytic sample.  We can also formally test the parallel-trends assumption.  To do so, we 
drop all post-policy observations (i.e., 1997-98 to 2005-06) and redefine the “post” variable 
to a “fake year” (i.e., 1995-96), choosing a year when the Top 10% Plan was not in effect.  
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 2.6.  None of the regressions show any 
significant difference-in-differences point estimates, that is, there are no statistically 
significant differences between our treatment (1st ACT quintile) and the control (2nd ACT 
quintile) groups prior to the implantation of the Top 10% Plan.   
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2.6.2.2. Open Enrollment, No Child Left Behind, and Texas School 
Accountability  
Open Enrollment 
In 1995 Texas enacted open enrollment laws that gave students in poorly performing 
school districts the option to enroll in higher-quality schools without changing residence.  
This could have potentially increased property values in low-performing school districts 
making the effects we are attributing to the Top 10% Plan simply a residual change from the 
enactment of open enrollment.  However, it is very unlikely that the open enrollment laws 
had any effect on property values at the school district level.  This is because though school 
districts were required to accept transfer requests from within the district they were not 
required to accept out of district transfer requests.  This made across district switches 
extremely rare and unlikely to influence property values.  To verify this, the above test of the 
parallel trends assumption also coincides with the enactment of open enrollment laws.  Since 
none of the regressions reported in Table 2.6 show any significant difference-in-differences 
point estimates, this helps to rule out open enrollment as an alternative explanation of our 
results. 
No Child Left Behind  
It is also possible that the passing of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act on 
January 8, 2002 causes our results.  The first school year affected by the NCLB was 2002-03.  
To check against such a possibility and gauge the stability of the point estimates shown in 
Table 2.3, we re-run our difference-in-differences analysis using different sized post-period 
windows.  Table 2.7 reports alternative regression results using three different sized post-
period windows.  Column (1) reports results using the full twelve year sample, which are the 
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results from Table 2.3.  Column (2) reports results using an eight-year period subsample, this 
analysis drops all of the school years in which NCLB was in effect: school years 2002-03, 
2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06.  Column (3) further restricts the sample to a six-year period 
window, three years in the pre-policy period, and an equal number in the post-policy period.  
The difference-in-differences point estimates are positive and significant in all of the 
alternative subsample analyses.  Thus, the results shown in Table 2.3 are robust to 
considering smaller windows around the implementation of the Top 10% Plan, and most 
importantly the results from column (3) also helps us rule out the passing of the NCLB Act 
as driving our results. 
Texas School Accountability 
 Another important policy change is the Texas school accountability requirements, 
which were introduced in 1993.  The school accountability measure likely affects low-
performing schools more than high-performing schools.  If the school accountability 
requirements became more stringent around 1997, then we may also observe larger 
performance improvement of low-performing than high-performing schools.  This would 
manifest itself in the housing market.  We address this concern by analyzing the Texas 
Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) pass rates for 3rd to 8th grades as the outcome.  These 
results are reported in Table 2.8.16  For 3rd to 6th grades, the sample does not include schools 
in the top quintile, so the estimates are relative to the second highest quintile (4th quintile).  
Most of the point estimates shown in Table 2.8 are insignificant; in particular, for 8th graders, 
all estimates are negative.  Estimates are negative and significant for the 2nd and 3rd quintiles, 
suggesting that low-performing schools actually performed worse relative to the top schools 
                                                          
16 The model estimated in Table 8 is the same as presented in equation (12), except that the top, rather than the 
bottom quintile is omitted. 
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in the post-Top10 years.  Overall, there is no consistent evidence of larger improvement in 
academic achievement for low-performing schools following the Top 10% policy; therefore, 
the estimates in Table 2.3 are unlikely to be driven by changes in school accountability in 
Texas.  
2.6.2.3. Robin Hood Plan 
Another schooling policy that likely did influence property values in Texas was the 
“Robin Hood Plan.”17  The Robin Hood Plan, true to its name was a scheme that 
redistributed recaptured tax revenues of school districts with a lot of property wealth per 
adjusted pupil to districts with little property wealth per adjusted pupil.  It is very possible 
that the Robin Hood Plan lowered property values in property rich places relative to values 
in property poor places. 
We can rule out Robin Hood on two counts.  The first is that Robin Hood was 
implemented in the 1993-94 school year.  This coincides with the beginning of our sample, 
so any time invariant effects of the Robin Hood Plan will difference out in our difference-in-
differences estimator.  The only way remaining that the Robin Hood Plan could serve as an 
alternative explanation for our results would be if the plan had time varying effects that 
intensified over time and if property poor districts coincide with poorly performing districts.  
If this is the case, then we would expect the lowest quality school districts to receive a larger 
amount of funding as the effect of the Robin Hood Plan intensifies over time.  We can test 
for this by running our difference-in-differences estimator with the amount of spending per 
pupil as a dependent variable.  Table 2.9 presents the results of this analysis.  All estimates 
                                                          
17 A thoughtful analysis of the Robin Hood Plan can be found in Hoxby and Kuziemko (2004). 
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are both negative and insignificant, which further discredits the Robin Hood Plan as an 
alternative explanation of our results. 
2.6.2.4. Longhorn Opportunity Scholarships 
 One further policy of note is the introduction of Longhorn Opportunity 
Scholarships in 2001.   Longhorn Scholarships are offered through the University of Texas 
at Austin (UT-Austin) and are tied to the Top 10% Plan.  These scholarships are aimed at 
helping students from schools that did not historically place many students at UT-Austin.  
To be eligible you must attend a school identified by UT-Austin as historically under or non-
represented at UT-Austin and be rank eligible under the Top 10% Plan.  These students get 
a scholarship of $5,000 per year for four years.  It is possible that our results are inflated by 
the effect of the Longhorn scholarships. 
 To eliminate the effect of these scholarships we re-estimate our difference-in-
differences estimator after dropping all schools listed by UT-Austin as eligible for Longhorn 
Opportunity Scholarships from the sample.18  The results of this estimation are reported in 
Table 2.10.  The results are nearly identical to those presented in Table 2.3, which rules out 
the effect of these scholarships as an alternative explanation for our results. 
2.6.3. School Competition: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Analysis 
The results for the number of schooling options are presented in Tables 2.11 and 
2.12.  Table 2.11 shows results from estimating equation (14).  All controls used in column 
(3) of Table 2.3 are used in the regressions for Table 2.11.  The coefficient of interest is the 
interaction between the difference-in-differences estimator and the county level kHHI .  The 
                                                          
18 44 schools are listed as eligible for Longhorn Opportunity Scholarships. 
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interaction is negative and significant, implying that the more monopolistic the county, the 
less the school districts in that county reacted to the implementation of the Top 10% Plan.   
Table 2.12 shows the difference-in-differences estimates from subsamples of 
counties that are the most monopolistic (i.e., have a higher kHHI  value for schooling) at the 
right of the table, and the least monopolistic (i.e., having a lower kHHI  value for schooling) 
at the left of the table.  Only the difference-in-differences estimators are reported, and each 
coefficient represents a separate regression.  Again, all controls used in column (3) of Table 
2.3 are used in the regressions for Table 2.12.19  The difference-in-differences point 
estimates only measure positive and significant in the locations with the largest amount of 
school choice.  Specifically, counties that were more monopolistic in nature were 
unresponsive to the policy shift.  In other words, areas where there are not a lot of local high 
school options to switch to did not respond to the Top 10% Plan.  In contrast, the 
responsive areas were counties with the lowest fifth of kHHI  measures: the difference-in-
differences point estimates are only positive and significant for the least monopolistic school 
districts.  Our results show that for counties with the lowest fifth of kHHI  measures, the 
average price grew by 3.4 percent in low-performing school districts.   
The HHI analysis suggests that if the changes in property values are due to 
households moving strategically, then these moves are likely short distance.  Furthermore, 
the kHHI  analysis reinforces the results presented in the previous section, as these results 
help to rule out alternative explanations.  For instance, it is possible that the growth in 
property values in low-quality school districts was due to the housing bubble and rapid 
                                                          
19 MSA fixed effects were not included because they are too closely related the quintile of HHI values to be 
used reliably given the sample size of the subsamples. 
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growth of subprime mortgages in the early years of the 2000s.  However, any growth in 
property values due to this housing bubble should be orthogonal to the schooling option 
variation used in the kHHI  analysis. 
Lastly, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the growth in property values from the pre-policy 
period to the post-policy period.  Figure 2.4 overlays the location of the least monopolistic 
counties from Table 2.12 onto the map in Figure 2.3.  This overlay illustrates that the growth 
in home values is spread across the state, and is not just relegated to specific areas.  These 
figures along with the HHI analysis provide a strong backing to our proposed mechanism of 
families moving to drive changes in property values.  It also helps to reinforce our earlier 
findings of a change in property values in response to the Top 10% Plan. 
2.7 Conclusion  
Since its implementation over 10 years ago, the Top 10% Plan has received only 
mixed reviews.  One of the main criticisms of this policy is that it is unfair to high-achieving 
students who attend elite high schools.  Because the Top 10% Plan is solely based on class 
rank and this criterion is applied to all high schools that use grade point averages to rank 
students, there is redistribution in the university system from students who graduate from 
high-performing high schools to automatically admitted students who graduate from low-
performing high schools.  On the other hand, while the goal of the Top 10% Plan was to 
improve access for disadvantaged and minority students, the use of a school-specific 
standard to determine eligibility has led to some other unintended effects. 
The estimate from our preferred specification implies that the implementation of the 
Top 10% Plan raised property values by 4.9 percent.  We can get a rough sense of the total 
effect on the tax base by running our main estimation strategy on the dependent variable of 
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total appraised property value in a school district.  The results of such a regression show a 
16.6 percent increase in the total property tax base.  If we arbitrarily divide the 16.6 percent 
evenly (i.e., assuming an 8.3 percent gain in aggregate property values in the bottom quintile 
and an 8.3 percent loss in aggregate property values in the second quintile) then one can see 
that the effect of the Top 10% Plan on the property tax base was potentially quite large.  The 
average district in the bottom quintile would have gained $344.9 million in their tax base and 
the average district in the 2nd quintile would have lost $129.9 million in their tax base.  If we 
apply an arbitrary property tax rate of 0.4796 percent (i.e., the property tax rate in the city of 
Austin, Texas in 2008) then there would be an additional $1.65 million in property taxes for 
the average district in the bottom quintile and $0.6 million less in property taxes for the 
average district in 2nd quintile.  These property tax estimates are by no means exact, especially 
since we do not know how the relative value shift is distributed between 2nd quintile losses 
and bottom quintile gains, and because these are only changes in single family homes and do 
not include other taxable properties that could have been affected.  However, these tax 
estimates do illustrate the type of effect that the Top 10% Plan had on the property tax 
landscape in Texas. 
The results from the HHI analysis reinforce this point even further.  The effects of 
the Top 10% Plan appear to be both spatially concentrated and of larger magnitude in places 
with many schooling options.  This implies that these places were likely hit with particularly 
large distortions to their property tax bases.  Any future implementations of or modifications 
to top x-percent plan admissions policies should bear in mind that the redistribution of 
educational resources will not be the only effect of such a policy change. 
38 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
3. Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of  Medical 
Malpractice Tort Reforms  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Andrew I. Friedson 
Syracuse University 
 
 
Thomas J. Kniesner 
Syracuse University and IZA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 The medical malpractice tort system in the United States has several purposes.  Most 
notorious is the goal of incenting doctors to practice so-called appropriate medicine through 
the negligence rule of liability.  The negligence aspect of the malpractice system has been 
widely studied for its implications on physician behavior, most notably the outcomes of 
practicing defensive medicine (Kessler and McClellan 1996, Kim 2007) or physician labor 
supply (Kessler, Sage, and Becker 2005; Matsa 2007).  Another purpose of the malpractice 
tort system is to provide compensation to injured patients.  The compensation is intended to 
offset economic damages from lost wages and the psychic costs of pain and suffering.  The 
medical malpractice tort system therefore also serves as an insurance against adverse 
outcomes that covers patients implicitly when consuming medical services.  Here we 
examine an under-appreciated dimension of the insurance aspect of the medical malpractice 
tort system, which is how tort reforms have affected the interpersonal distribution of 
patients’ implicit insurance.20 
 To elaborate, we use closed claims from the state of Texas to examine 
econometrically how a reform package impacts people seeking recompense under their 
implicit insurance – people who have been negligently injured and are trying to get quick 
compensation.  The particular reform package of interest was part of the Texas 2003 HB 4 
law, which introduced two changes to the Texas malpractice liability system: (1) a cap on 
non-economic damages and (2) an early offer system. 
The most widespread policy reform of medical malpractice has been a cap on 
non-economic damages.  Caps have been implemented in about half the states and their 
effects widely studied in terms of their total cost implications for the medical care system 
                                                          
20 A parallel line of research examines differences in damage cap effects across insurance providers (Viscusi and 
Born 2005). 
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(Danzon 1985, Donohue and Ho 2007, Lakdawalla and Seabury 2009, and Mello et al. 2010 
to name a few). Damage caps put a maximum on how much can be paid out and, as such, 
lower the likelihood of a so-called blockbuster case.21  A consequence is a lower average 
payout per case (Avraham 2007) plus a shorter length of time to settlement as caps reduce 
the variance between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s expected values of the case (Abraham 
2001).  
Early offer schemes create incentives for plaintiffs and defendants to settle early and 
punish them for passing up so-called good deals.  In Texas, the early offer scheme forces the 
side that turned down the early offer to pay the other side’s legal fees if it can be shown after 
the case that the party in question would have been better off accepting the offer.  Not only 
do early offer reforms save considerable time in the litigation process (Hersch, O’Connell, 
and Viscusi 2007) but they also lower the payouts in malpractice litigation (Black, Hyman, 
and Silver 2009). 
 Both components of the Texas reforms, damage caps and early offer schemes, have 
similar effects on the insurance that is implicit in the medical malpractice liability system.  
The implicit insurance claims here have smaller, quicker payouts after the reforms.  Whether 
or not the reforms improve the economic well-being of the holder of the policy depends on 
two factors.  The first is the cost of the insurance paid implicitly through changes in patients’ 
costs of medical services.  Evidence is far from plentiful, but research suggests that 
physicians respond to changes in malpractice liability mainly via services quantities and not 
                                                          
21 Although not a perfect match, damage caps parallel bankruptcy law. One has an asset with uncertain value 
(the right to sue here/the right to declare bankruptcy). It could be worth zero (you lose the case/cannot declare 
for legal reasons or benefits could be totally offset by a lowered credit score). It could also be worth a lot (you 
win the case/you are able to declare bankruptcy and protect your assets). The outcome is ambiguous as risk 
abounds (juries/uncertainty as to the law or how severely your credit score will be affected). In both tort cases 
and bankruptcy there is an intermediate way out (settlement/ debt restructuring that is less protection of assets 
or less of a disruption to one’s credit score). 
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prices (Danzon 1990, Lakdawalla and Seabury 2009, Kessler 2011), although the final 
chapter of this dissertation does show price sensitivity for procedures performed by risky 
specialties.  Second, the ultimate welfare effect of the reforms depends on the implicit policy 
holders’ time preference.  We therefore calculate the change in the value of a settlement by 
considering both the size of the settlement and the time it takes to reach the settlement. 
 Specifically, we look at how the value of a settlement changes across different age 
demographics after the reform was enacted.  The change in settlement value comes from 
three channels: a direct effect of the reform lowering the amount of the average settlement, 
an indirect effect of the reform lowering the average amount that a claimant asks for, and a 
timing effect of the reform speeding up the time until settlement.  We find that claimants in 
their prime working years suffer the largest economic loss in settlement value.  The age 
pattern is true for the mean, median and maximum entropy quantile of settlement amounts 
across age groups although the most informative location in the distribution is most often 
the median.  Our results differ from the common belief that medical malpractice reforms 
have the largest negative impact on the settlements of the very young and the elderly.22 
3.1 Theoretical Considerations 
To understand the fundamental economics of the decision to settle and why there 
may be age and other interpersonal differences in malpractice insurance damage caps’ effects 
consider two actors  and B.  Here both have been negligently injured and now have the 
right to sue. The right to sue is a risky asset  that takes on two values.  An actor can go to 
court and will win with probability , in which case  takes on the value , or may lose 
                                                          
22 Medical malpractice damage caps supposedly reduce settlements for the young and the elderly most because 
they do not have large earnings and, as such, do not have large economic damages to claim (Finley 2004; Rubin 
and Shepherd 2008). 
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with probability  in which case  takes on the value zero.  For simplicity, assume that 
 although the exercise that follows does not depend on this assumption. 
A and B have different risk preferences: A is risk neutral and B is risk averse.  More 
formally, the actors have respective utility functions  and  such that  
 and .  We also assume that 
 and that the utility functions do not cross.  This gives the two utility 
functions shown in Figure 3.1. 
Let .  Each actor receives utility from the asset,  person A 
receives , which can be seen in Figure 3.1 by tracing up from  to 
 and over to the vertical axis.  B receives expected utility , which can be seen 
in Figure 3.1 by tracing up from  to the ray connecting the origin to  and over to 
the vertical axis.  Both actors are indifferent between going to court and a settlement that 
gives them their expected utility of the risky asset, and will settle for that amount or any 
greater amount. Person B is willing to accept a settlement of less than  due to risk 
aversion.23  There will then be age differences in settlement willingness to the extent that risk 
aversion varies by age (Halek and Eisenhauer 2001, Anderson et al. 2008). 
Now consider a cap on the amount that can be recovered in damages in a court 
award.  This will change the maximum amount of the risky asset.  The new asset  can now 
either take on the value zero or  with equal probability.  Let .  We can find 
each actor’s utility from the new asset in a similar fashion as before.  Person A receives 
, which can be seen in Figure 3.1 by tracing up from  to  
                                                          
23 The more risk averse actor accepting a smaller settlement appears in a more general case of two risk averse 
bargainers who will go to an uncertain arbitrator if they cannot reach a settlement by Crawford (1984). In 
Crawford’s model, an increase of an actor’s risk aversion leads to a decrease in their settlement all else equal. 
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and over to the vertical axis.  B receives expected utility , which can be seen in 
Figure 3.1 by tracing up from  to the ray connecting the origin to  and over to 
the vertical axis. 
If we take the difference between the utility from the original asset , and the capped 
asset  we get  for actor A, and  for actor B.  It is immediately noticeable that , 
or that the less risk averse actor has a larger reduction in utility from the implementation of a 
cap on damages.  The implication is that risk aversion differences by age or predicted 
settlement size can lead to age and other differences in the welfare loss from damage caps. 
There are a few remarks that should be made about the above exercise.  The first is 
that the behavioral implications do not depend on one of the actors being risk neutral.  If 
actor A is also risk averse the result that the less risk averse party suffers a larger utility loss is 
maintained as long as the other assumptions are still met.  It is also important to note that 
actors’ changes in minimum acceptable settlements do not follow as clean a rule as their 
changes in utility.  A careful inspection of Figure 3.1 may make it look as if there is a clear 
association between changes in minimum acceptable settlement and the relative risk aversion 
of the actors, but that is an artifice of A being risk neutral.  Any systematic effects of 
possible interpersonal differences in relative risk aversion and their attendant implications 
for how damage caps affect the size (asset value) of the settlement needs to be discovered 
empirically. 
3.2 Data 
The data we use to estimate the distributional consequences of malpractice reforms 
come from the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claims Database (CCD), which 
include every insurance claim over $10,000 closed in Texas during 1988-2007.  The data 
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include indications of the type of insurance and the party purchasing the insurance so that 
one can identify cases that deal specifically with medical malpractice.  The subset of the data 
we use includes 21,733 claims on medical malpractice insurance policies of health care 
providers including physicians, dentists, hospitals, and nursing homes. 
 Each of our data points is a closed claim.  Although there are data for 2007, there 
can be cases originating prior to 2007 that closed after 2007 and so are not represented.  
Each claim provides information on the time, location, and type of injury (the closed claims 
report uses broad definitions such as brain damage or back injury rather than diagnosis 
codes).  For the injured party the data include age, employment status, and availability of 
compensation other than torts.  The CCD also has comprehensive information concerning 
any and all legal action that took place including all settlement amounts and jury awards.  
Finally there is limited information on the defendants, including the type of entity the 
defendant (or defendants) is (are) plus information about the payout limits associated with its 
policies, and the estimates of litigation and indemnity costs by its insurance providers. 
 To ensure that we are not looking at people who are deliberately trying for a so-
called blockbuster jury award we limit our sample to cases settled in three years or less (the 
average length of a case that reaches a verdict is 5.5 years).24  The result is a sample of 6,130 
observations.  Figure 3.2 shows the density of claims by year for both settled claims and 
claims that go to verdict.  By limiting our sample to three years we exclude most cases that 
would have been settled close to verdict. 
The main outcomes we examine are the total amount of a settlement conditional on 
settlement before a verdict, the amount of compensation demanded by the claimant 
                                                          
24 Later we examine the robustness of our results to the length of the settlement window. 
45 
 
conditional on settlement before a verdict and the time until settlement.  Because it is a 
claims database, the CCD contains plentiful information on the relevant insurer and its 
behavior during the claims process . Of greatest importance is the indemnity reserve, which 
is the amount of money that the insurance company has set aside to pay for damages.  The 
indemnity reserve is the insurance company’s best estimate of the risk associated with a 
possible jury award or settlement, and effectively controls for many characteristics of the 
injury.  Last, the claims database that we use also contains information on the specific 
policies’ per accident maximum payout limits. 
 Table 3.1 contains the summary statistics for the data we use in the econometric 
estimation to follow.  The first row documents the substantial reduction (about 55 percent) 
in the settlement amount after the reform, the second row documents a similar (50 percent) 
reduction in cash demanded, and the third row documents the notable reduction (33-45 
percent) in case duration.  There is clear evidence that the Texas reforms affected the ceiling 
of damages and encouraged quicker settlements on average.  Our subsequent econometric 
models clarify the distributional consequences and the channels at work in the tort reforms 
producing the outcomes summarized in Table 3.1. 
3.3 Empirical Methods and Results 
 Estimating the component effects of the tort reform can be done with a multi-step 
procedure.  First we estimate the amount that average settlement compensation decreased 
directly.  Then we estimate the indirect effect in settlement amount via changes in cash 
demanded.  We then estimate the reduction in time to settlement after the reform.  In all 
cases we consider distributional issues such as heterogeneity by age, settlement amounts or 
time to settlement. 
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3.3.1. Settlement Amounts and Initial Cash Demanded 
To begin to disentangle the two effects from other variables that are also related to 
the size and speed of compensation, we first estimate two multivariate OLS regressions of 
the following algebraic forms: 
(1) Yit = α01 + β11X1it + γ1Cit + δ1Rt  and 
(2) Cit = α02 + β12 X2it + δ2Rt. 
Here Y is a claim settlement amount, X is a vector of time varying control variables whose 
effect we wish to remove from our estimate of the effect of the reform, C is initial cash 
demanded, and R is an indicator variable equal to one in the time period after the reform has 
been enacted, and zero otherwise.  Thus, δk (k = 1, 2) is the estimated effect of the reform 
on either the amount of the settlement or the amount initially demanded by the claimant.  
 The OLS results in Table 3.2 illustrate the post-reform settlement amount holding 
constant other factors, including cash demanded, which we view as an indicator of an initial 
signal of how likely the claimant is willing to settle.  The results for the pooled ages in the 
last column indicate a $59,000 reduction in the settlement amount post-reform, which is 
about 13 percent of the pre-reform mean.  The disaggregated results show that the groups 
most affected by the reform are people in the 20s and 30s, and that the reform is non-neutral 
by age. 
A final result of note in Table 3.2 is that for all the age groups there is a significant 
effect of initial cash demanded on settlements, with the largest impact on babies, where 
settlements rise by about $0.74 for every $1 of cash demanded initially.  The consequence is 
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that one also need examine the effect of damage caps on the initial demands which, as noted, 
may indicate bargaining rigidity of the claimant. 
There is a substantial change in the post-reform period in initial cash demanded. For 
the pooled (N = 6,130) regression in Table 3.3 there is about a 40 percent reduction in initial 
cash demanded. So, when paired with the results of Table 3.2, the percentage total effect of 
the reform, 100(δ1 + γ1δ2)/µY(pre-reform), is to reduce settlements by an average of about 38 
percent of the pre-reform average settlement, or by a total of $177,000.  Once again the 
results are heterogeneous by age, so that the largest dollar effects in Table 3.3 are in the 
prime working years.  This may indicate that working age people care about getting back to 
work quickly compared to those close to retirement who may be more willing to endure a 
protracted settlement period.  
3.3.2. Time to Settlement 
 To examine the issue of how the reform affected time to payment we also estimated 
Cox (1972) proportional hazard models 
 (3)  hi(t) = h0(t)exp(β13Xit + γ3Cit + δ3Rt),  
with standard errors calculated using the robust method in Lin and Wei (1979).  Here the 
antilog of the coefficient of the reform dummy implies the hazard ratios in Table 3.4, which 
are revealed in the survival functions illustrated in Figure 3.3.  Note, for example, that pre-
reform virtually no case had settled by the 500 day mark, while post-reform about one-third 
had settled.  Similarly, it took about 50 percent longer for half the cases to have settled pre 
reform versus post reform.  
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 From the estimated hazard ratios in Table 3.4 we see that, on average, people settle 
about 50 percent faster with the largest effect (−60 percent) on cases involving infants.  
Again there is substantial heterogeneity in the estimated effect of the reform on time until 
settlement, as cases involving the elderly are settled 40 percent more quickly.  Finally, we 
note that unlike the level of settlements in no case is the time to settlement affected by initial 
cash demanded so that there is no influence of the policy reform on time to settlement via a 
moderation of cash demanded channel.  
3.3.3. Effect of the Reform on the Economic Value of Settlements 
 Using the procedure described in the Appendix we display in Table 3.5 the economic 
effects of the reform in the terms of its impact on the asset value of a malpractice settlement 
and its heterogeneity by age.  Table 3.5 breaks the effect of the policy out by channels, the 
direct effect on the settlement amount, the indirect effect via decreased cash demands, and 
then the change in timing from speedier settlements. 
For all ages, while speeding up the time to payment by about 420 days, the effect of 
reform on settlements is to reduce the present value by 36 percent.25 Once again there is 
substantial heterogeneity by age.  Persons in their 30s demand about $175,000 less and then 
have an average settlement that is about $103,000 lower that is paid only about 421 days (50 
percent) faster so that the implicit asset value of the settlement is about 60 percent lower.  
The tort reforms are not welfare improving in a basic economic sense.  One possible 
explanation for the heterogeneity by age is that claimants in their prime working age have a 
different level of relative risk aversion than those with injured children or the elderly.  It is 
                                                          
25 Present value calculations use the average of the interest rate on a 3-month T-bill over the time period of our 
sample. 
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also possible that working age claimants settle for less in an attempt to expedite the 
settlement process and return to work as quickly as possible. 
3.3.4. Additional Dimensions of the Distributional Consequences of the 
Reform 
 There is much research demonstrating the usefulness of quantile regression in 
examining the distributional consequences of economic interventions in the labor market 
(Kniesner, Viscusi, and Ziliak 2010) and in the case of medical malpractice insurance 
(Viscusi and Born 2005).  The standard quantile regression model has an expression for the 
fitted residual that in our case is 
(4)  or 
(5) . 
Next there is a multiplier  where 
(6)  
with q the quantile of interest. The quantile regression is then 
(7)  , 
which is solved via linear programming (Armstrong, et al. 1975). 
Recent research adds a parameter (τ) that, when minimized in conjunction with (4)-(7), 
reveals the most probable or maximum entropy quantile (Golan 2006, Bera et al. 2010).26  In 
                                                          
26 One can also intuit τ as a penalty for deviating from the median as the most likely quantile. 
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terms of policy interventions one should be particularly interested in the most likely effect 
size, which comes from the most likely quantile. 
 Table 3.6 presents the estimated maximum entropy quantile for the various age 
groups.  The point of the exercise is to reveal more of the policy heterogeneity.  Note that 
the estimated maximum entropy quantile is lower for older people.  Although it is close to 
the median for ages 50-69 in no other age group is the median outcome the place in the 
fitted settlement distribution that is most likely. 
 There is a great deal of heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across conditional 
quantiles of cash demanded and settlement amounts.  The differing effects of the policy are 
presented in Figure 3.4 for conditional quantiles of settlement amount and in Figure 3.5 for 
conditional quantiles of cash demanded for the pooled sample.  The negative effect of the 
policy on settlement amounts peaks at the 30th conditional quantile and then drops off at the 
quantiles increase.  For cash demanded the effect of the policy is monotonically increasing in 
magnitude with the conditional quantile.  Because of the differing effects, if a part of the 
distribution other than the mean is most likely, then using that quantile rather than the mean 
will make a sizable difference in the value of the settlement to the most likely claimant. 
 The heterogeneity in policy effects and the difference it makes in focusing on the 
most likely place in the distribution of potential outcomes are highlighted in Table 3.7 where 
we compare estimated mean, median, and maximum entropy quantile malpractice reform 
effects on asset value lost.  Note that for people in their 30s the most likely effect is less than 
half the mean effect.  Alternatively, the most likely effect is much larger (−28 percent) than 
the mean effect (0) in the case of young people 3-19.  It is also the case that (1) there is little 
heterogeneity in effect by age group for the vast majority of the groups and (2) the most 
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likely quantile estimates are fairly similar to the estimates one would get from a median 
regression.  In practice, a simple least absolute deviation regression trimming the outliers is 
an important improvement over OLS when estimating medical malpractice reform effects.  
The conclusion again emerging is that on pure economic asset returns grounds the policy is 
welfare reducing in that claimants would have benefitted economically from a slower larger 
settlement typical of the pre-reform period.  It is also the case that infants and the elderly are 
not the hardest hit. In addition to infants having the smallest expected effects from damage 
caps the largest percentage asset loss is among people in their 50s. 
3.3.5. Robustness Check    
The final econometric issue we confront is whether our results are sensitive to small 
changes in the assumed settlement period window of three years.  Table 3.8 presents 
settlement results for a 3.5 year time frame compared to a 3 year window, which enlarges the 
sample size by 50 percent.  Note the similarity of results of interest, the estimated values of γ 
and δ, with those in Table 3.2.27  Table 3.9 repeats the robustness checking exercise for the 
dependent variable of cash demanded by the claimant.  Again, the results are similar to those 
found in the three year window. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 Because of its many perceived benefits state legislatures have found tort reform 
attractive.  Reforms such as damage caps and early offer systems speed up cases and help 
reduce caseloads in the courts.  They also lower the size of claims, which possibly decreases 
so-called wasteful defensive medicine and decreases the related stress costs on physicians.  
Another touted benefit of tort reforms are that they cut down on claims that lack merit and 
                                                          
27 Results not tabulated are similar for settlement windows of 3.25 or 3.75 years.  
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help prevent blockbuster jury awards that are perceived to increase the overall cost of health 
care.  The benefits we have mentioned are not without a downside.  Our evidence suggests 
that although injured parties who may desire quicker payment are indeed compensated more 
quickly after the reforms the cost of doing so is large, perhaps to the point that given the 
choice specified in clear economic terms they would prefer the previous system, particularly 
persons of prime working ages.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 The costs of the entire medical malpractice system are estimated to be around $55.6 
billion in 2008 dollars (Mello et al 2010), a relatively small number when compared to all 
U.S. health care costs.  However, medical malpractice tort reform is a contentious issue that 
garners a lot of public attention and is continually placed at the forefront of many states’ 
legislative agendas.  Since 2000, thirteen states have in some way changed their laws 
pertaining to medical malpractice liability.  Most of these states enacted or modified a cap on 
non-economic damages awardable in medical malpractice tort cases.28  The argument for 
non-economic damage caps is that they decrease the malpractice risk on physicians, and as 
such should decrease malpractice insurance premiums.  To the extent that this cost 
reduction is passed through to consumers, the price of health care should also be decreased 
by caps on damages. 
It has been loosely established that increases in malpractice risk to physicians 
increase the market price of health services.  Baicker and Chandra (2004) find a slight effect 
of malpractice risk on the price of mammography, but no evidence of effects on the price of 
cesarean section (c-section) or angioplasty.  Lakdawalla and Seabury’s 2009 study shows that 
per-bed-day hospital expenditures are responsive to jury awards in medical malpractice cases.  
The most general evidence is a study by Danzon, Pauly, and Kington (1990) that 
demonstrates a direct link between the risk of being sued for medical malpractice and the 
fees charged by physicians.29  There has been no prior empirical work linking tort reforms 
such as damage caps to changes in market prices.  This study is the first to link the 
implementation of damage caps directly to changes in market prices, and serves as new 
                                                          
28  31 states have some sort of cap on medical malpractice damages in place as of 2011. 
29 The Danzon, Pauly and Kington study is limited by its use of repeated cross section data and a small number 
of cross sections. 
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evidence on the relationship between the market price of medical services and malpractice 
risk on physicians in general. 
I use a large data set of health insurance claims to private insurers along with 
variation in the implementation of state malpractice tort laws to estimate the effect of non-
economic damage caps on the amount physicians charge to insurance companies for specific 
procedures and the amount that insurance companies agree to reimburse doctors for those 
procedures.30  I pay special attention to procedures in the field of Obstetrics and Gynecology 
(Ob-Gyn) because of its status as a high malpractice risk specialty.31  I also look at several 
procedures in other fields.  My estimates of the effect of non-economic damage caps are 
obtained using two variants of a difference in differences method.  The first variant uses 
within state variation to identify the effect of damage caps on the price of services.  The 
second variant uses within metropolitan statistical area (MSA) variation, gaining 
identification from MSAs that straddle state borders. 
Of particular interest are any differences between changes in the allowed amount 
(the price paid out by an insurance company and the price observed in the market) and 
changes in the amount that physicians bill insurance companies for the same specific 
procedures.  Differences in these two values show whether physicians lowered the price they 
asked for in response to a cap on damages, or if insurance companies lowered the amount 
that they paid out.  These estimated changes in tandem provide an intriguing look into how 
shocks in physician costs are translated into the market for physician services. 
                                                          
30 Data Source: FAIR Health, Inc., an independent, New York nonprofit corporation. 
31 Phelps (2003) shows that physicians in the field of Obstetrics and Gynecology face a much higher ratio of 
malpractice insurance premiums to the rate of negligent events than other specialties. 
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I find that damage caps have a sizable impact on the allowed amount of some, but 
not all services.  Estimated reductions in the allowed amount in response to the 
implementation of damage caps are as large as 14.5 percent.  I find much smaller and often 
no changes in the amount that physicians charge insurance companies, suggesting that the 
price changes are driven by insurers bargaining down the price of care.  The greatest part of 
the price reduction occurs in urban areas, which is unsurprising as most procedures are 
performed in urban areas and as urban areas have more inelastic demand for medical 
services. 
4.2 Background 
 Suits for medical malpractice are filed under a state’s tort law.  An individual can 
bring a case against a physician that treated her by claiming that the physician acted 
negligently and that the negligence led to an adverse outcome.  Three types of damages are 
awardable: economic damages for lost income and medical expenses, non-economic 
damages for pain and suffering, and on rare occasion punitive damages if it can be shown 
that the physician acted in a criminal manner.32  Because being sued is a rare event that is 
potentially quite costly, physicians are required to carry insurance against medical 
malpractice.  Medical malpractice insurance is not experience rated on the individual level, 
and as such premiums for insurance are reflective of the risks inherent to all members of a 
physician’s specialty in their specific state. 
Despite the presence of malpractice insurance, the risk of suit is still something that 
physicians will take great pains to reduce, as the experience of being sued is both time-
                                                          
32 Unlike economic damages which measure lost wages, and punitive damages whose values are dictated by law, 
there is no clear standard for valuing non-economic damages.  As such, there is the greatest variation in non-
economic damages. 
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consuming, stressful, and carries large additional costs if the physician hires his own lawyer.  
The literature has identified three margins of response by which doctors adjust their 
behavior in response to the risk of suit: doctors change how they practice, where they 
practice, and they try to pass on the cost of the risk to consumers.  Though all these 
outcomes are of importance to understanding the effect malpractice risk and tort reform on 
the market, this study will focus primarily on the last of the three. 
The literature on malpractice risk and the price of medical services is small, largely 
because comprehensive data on physician pricing, and the interaction between physicians 
and health insurance companies is difficult to come by.   Baicker and Chandra (2004) find a 
slight effect of malpractice risk on the price of mammography, but no evidence of effects on 
the price of c-section or angioplasty.  Also, the work by Lakdawalla and Seabury (2009) 
suggests that per-bed-day hospital expenditures are responsive to jury awards in medical 
malpractice cases.  The most general evidence is in work by Danzon, Pauly, and Kington 
(1990).  They use three survey cross sections to demonstrate a direct link between the risk of 
being sued for medical malpractice and the fees charged by physicians. 
4.2.1. Damage Caps and the Price of Medical Services 
 Though there has been no previous empirical work linking damage caps to price 
reductions for medical services, there is much theoretical evidence that would suggest that 
this would be the case.  Danzon, Pauly, and Kington (1990) present some simple models in 
which the price of medical services is linked to the “generosity” of a legal system in a 
positive way (i.e. larger awards would cause higher prices).  More recently, King (2010) 
develops a model in which the cost of malpractice insurance, which is tied to malpractice 
risk, is passed through in full to consumers. 
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 Thaler and Sunstein (2008) suggest that malpractice liability should be thought of in 
a hedonic framework.  Patients pay for medical services; which are a bundle of attributes that 
includes the right to sue for negligence.  To the extent that the right to sue is curtailed their 
willingness to pay for medical services should decrease.  Likewise doctors would be willing 
to charge less if they do not face as much malpractice risk – this could be viewed as either a 
shift in supply or as a compensating wage differential.  The size of the shift in prices would 
depend on the relative elasticities of supply and demand, but would be unambiguous in 
direction: increases in the generosity of the tort system would increase prices, decreases 
would decrease prices. 
 Missing in the above models is the inclusion of private health insurers in the market.  
Observed prices in the marketplace are the result of a bargaining game between physicians 
and private health insurers.  Thus, decreases in prices may be magnified if insurance 
companies have bargaining power. 
 To illustrate, consider a Cournot model of oligopoly as a representation of physicians 
in the marketplace.33  Physicians certainly are not monopolists, but at the same time do not 
face pure competition either.  The markup in a Cournot model is, 
1
D
p mcm
p Nη
−
= = −     (1)  
where m is the markup, N is the number of physicians in the market and Dη  is the price 
elasticity of demand.  The markup is the percentage of the price that is over and above the 
marginal cost of production.  The markup is a surplus that physicians receive, and is divided 
in a bargaining game with health insurance companies.  Hence, the amount insurers 
reimburse physicians is marginal cost plus whatever percentage of the markup that 
                                                          
33 A thorough treatment of the Cournot model can be found in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995). 
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physicians receive in the bargaining game.  When insurance companies have more bargaining 
power, they receive a larger piece of the surplus.  It should also be noted that markups are 
bigger in places with more inelastic demand, such as urban areas.34  This is seen easily, by 
taking the derivative of the markup with respect to Dη . 
2
1
D D
m
Nη η
∂
=
∂
     (2) 
The result is positive, indicating that as Dη  increases (recall that demand elasticity is 
negative), or as demand becomes more inelastic, the markup increases. 
There are two channels by which prices could decrease from a cap on noneconomic 
damages.  First, the cap will decrease the cost of malpractice insurance and the risk of being 
sued, which will lower marginal cost and by construction, the price of care.35  The second 
channel is that insurers may gain bargaining power from the implementation of a cap.  For 
example, doctors could no longer claim at the bargaining table that their cost of malpractice 
insurance is quite as high and that they need a higher price to survive. 
An increase in insurer bargaining power would result in greater price decreases in places with 
inelastic demand (cities) relative to those with more elastic demand (rural areas).  Cities 
would have greater markups than rural areas, and thus an equivalent increase in insurer 
bargaining power in cities and rural areas would have a greater price decrease in urban areas 
simply because there is more surplus to be divided. 
 For the above mechanism to work it is necessary for caps on non-economic damages 
to curtail patients right to sue (which they do by definition), and for caps on non-economic 
                                                          
34 Urban areas have a much larger percentage of the population which has health insurance (Ormond, 
Zuckerman, and Lhila 2000) which makes the demand for medical services more inelastic (Manning et al 1987). 
35 Premiums for malpractice insurance scale with the size of the practice, so medical malpractice insurance 
premiums are indeed a marginal cost. 
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damages to lower the risk imposed on physicians.  Sloan and Chepke (2008) provide a 
review of the literature on the effects of tort reforms on the legal system and malpractice 
insurance premiums.  Though there is no evidence that damage caps decrease claim 
frequency significantly, it has been shown that damage caps do indeed decrease claim 
payments and malpractice insurance premiums in a significant fashion.36  Therefore, the cost 
of malpractice risk to physicians should in some part be passed on to consumers. 
4.3 Data 
 The data I use come from several sources.  Price data comes from the 
Medical/Surgical module of FAIR Health database of private health insurance claims; tort 
law data was created by merging information from the McCullough, Campbell & Lane LLP 
records with the records of the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA).  Additional 
time varying state level characteristics come from the Health Resources and Services 
Administration’s (HRSA) Area Resource File (ARF).  These data sources were combined to 
create several data sets spanning the years 2003 to 2007. 
The Medical/Surgical module of the FAIR Health database reports private health 
insurance claims for individual patients and accounts for roughly 28 percent of the total 
number of private insurer claims in the United States in a given year.  Individual procedure 
types can be identified via the American Medical Association’s Current Procedure 
Terminology codes.  Each claim’s date is known, and they can be matched to states and 
MSAs via three digit zip codes.  The three digit zip codes are flagged as urban or rural based 
                                                          
36 Damage caps and early offer reforms have also been shown to decrease the amount that plaintiffs ask for by 
Hyman et al (2009), as well as in the previous chapter. 
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on Census Bureau definitions.37  The FAIR Health database is very large, containing several 
billion observations in totality. 
For analysis I use data on eight procedures that vary in their risk.  The first four 
procedures are all commonly performed by Ob-Gyns: c-sections, vaginal deliveries, 
transvaginal ultrasounds on non-pregnant women, and abdominal ultrasounds on women in 
the first trimester of pregnancy.  I put extra focus on Ob-Gyns because of their place in the 
medical malpractice literature as a specialty of particular interest.  The second four 
procedures are performed commonly by non-Ob-Gyns: coronary artery bypass graft 
(CABG) surgery, chest x-rays, fifteen minute office visits and tetanus shots. 
 Delivery is by far the riskiest procedure performed by Ob-Gyns.  Vaginal delivery 
can often have complications, and if they occur, then Ob-Gyns are often sued on the 
grounds that they waited too long to deliver and did not perform a c-section, which is a far 
less risky procedure.  For non-Ob-Gyns CABG surgery is also quite common, usually 
performed by cardiothoracic and vascular surgeons, and also carries with it a fair amount of 
risk for the patients. 
Transvaginal ultrasounds and abdominal ultrasounds are both very common 
diagnostic tests performed by Ob-Gyns.  Transvaginal ultrasounds test the health of the 
reproductive system before conception and abdominal ultrasounds test the health of the 
early fetus.  Similarly, chest x-rays are incredibly common diagnostic tests used by non-Ob-
Gyns, and are used to diagnose a multitude of problems in the chest cavity.  Fifteen minute 
office visits and tetanus shots are two very common general procedures performed by all 
                                                          
37 Each zip code is flagged by the Census Bureau as either urban or rural based on population density and other 
criteria (for example airports or city parks which have no population density are still tagged as urban).  I 
consider a three digit zip code to be urban if over fifty percent of that thee digit zip code’s population resides in 
urban five digit zip codes. 
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specialties and general practitioners respectively.  Tetanus shots do carry a small amount of 
risk: there has been a history of malpractice cases involving children suffering adverse side 
effects from the vaccine. 
For all of the above procedures, I can observe two outcomes of interest.  The main 
outcome of interest is the amount the insurance company pays the physician (henceforth the 
allowed amount).  The allowed amount is the outcome of a bargaining process between the 
insurer and health care provider and is the price actually observed in the market.  The second 
outcome is the amount the health care provider submits to the health insurer (henceforth the 
charged amount).  The charged amount is the physician’s initial offer in the price bargaining 
game, and is also what the market price would be for uninsured individuals. 
For both variables any negative values (errors in the data) or zero amounts 
(situations in which the insurer denied payment) were dropped, resulting in a subset of the 
data that only looks at situations where services were paid for.  I am also able to observe if 
the insurer is a health maintenance organization (HMO), preferred provider organization 
(PPO) or point of service plan (POS).  In many cases the insurer type is not reported, these 
cases are grouped together into a plan type unknown category.  The top half of Table 4.1 
reports summary statistics for the eight procedures.  All prices are expressed in constant 
2002 dollars using the consumer price index. 
McCullough, Campbell & Lane LLP is a law firm in Chicago that specializes in 
insurance law.  It maintains an online database of current state laws pertaining to medical 
malpractice tort law.  Further, the ATRA keeps an online record of all state legal changes 
that impact medical malpractice tort law.  Using McCullough Campbell & Lane LLP and 
ATRA records, I constructed a database of all state laws regarding medical malpractice torts 
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from 2003 to 2007.  I then merged the database of tort laws with subsets of the FAIR health 
data.  Table 4.2 reports all changes in tort law during between 2003 and 2007.38   
HRSA publishes the ARF annually.  It includes information on the health services 
market as well as general demographic information taken from the Census Bureau.  I use 
yearly measures at the state level of the number of physicians, the general population, and 
median household income from the ARF.  These variables are summarized at the bottom of 
Table 4.1. 
4.4 Descriptive Results 
 A general sense of the effect of implementing a damage cap can be gained by a 
comparison of two similar states, one that implements a cap, and one that does not.  
Figure 4.1 shows the average allowed amount for an abdominal ultrasound during the first 
trimester of pregnancy for North and South Carolina.  South Carolina implemented a cap on 
non-economic damages which came into effect in 2005, North Carolina had no cap.  South 
Carolina appears to experience a drop in the average allowed amount for an ultrasound after 
the cap on damages is enacted, whereas no such drop is observed in North Carolina.  In fact, 
prices in North Carolina were rising during this time. 
 The average price of an ultrasound was $155.19 in South Carolina before the cap was 
enacted and $127.15 after the cap was enacted.  In North Carolina the average price was 
$113.31 before the cap was enacted and $132.48 after the cap was enacted.  This yields a 
rough difference in differences of -$47.20 or a 30.5% decrease in the price in South Carolina 
                                                          
38 The shaded out reforms are those enacted for 2003 or those reforms that are not caps on non-economic 
damages, the variation from the shaded reforms cannot be used for identification of the effect of a damage cap. 
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relative to North Carolina.  This is by no means a well identified result, but it does give a 
sense of how prices move in response to a cap on non-economic damages. 
4.5 Methods 
 I identify the effect of non-economic damage caps on the price of medical services 
using within state variation.  This is done by estimating the following fixed effects model. 
  (3) 
The dependent variables used are the log allowed amount for a medical service or the log 
charged amount,  reported by the individual claim i, in state s, in year t.  is a 
function of the a vector of claim characteristics , which includes the type of insurance plan 
as well as if the procedure was performed in an urban area, a dummy variable for if the state 
has a cap on non-economic damages  a vector of state characteristics including other tort 
laws  a state fixed effect , a year fixed effect  and a random error term .  The 
coefficient  that is associated with the implementation of a damage cap will give the effect 
of the cap’s implementation on the price of the service.  It is possible for an omitted variable 
to bias the estimate of if it was correlated with the price of medical services and with the 
implementation of each individual state cap. 
 The above identification strategy also relies on the assumption that there were no 
pre-existing state specific trends that could explain changes in price attributed to the 
implementation of caps on non-economic damages.  This parallel trends assumption proves 
difficult to test with a maximum of two years of data before a cap was implemented.  
Evidence from Malani and Reif (2010) shows that many medical malpractice tort reforms 
have sizable anticipation effects, so a test of the parallel trends assumption would likely 
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falsely reject the null of parallel trends in the period before the cap was implemented.39  It 
should be noted that the existence of differential trends where the state enacting the damage 
cap has falling prices is unlikely, as caps tend to be passed in response to prolonged increases 
in the price of medical services. 
 The sample sizes used for analysis can be quite large, in some cases over 250 million 
observations.  When sample sizes are so large, the usual critical values may not be entirely 
appropriate, as the chance of finding statistical significance grows disproportionately to the 
chance of rejecting a null that is indeed true.  To aid in interpretation I also report statistical 
significance based on the Leamer-Schwarz critical value as suggested by Deaton (1997).  
These critical values are set at  where n is the sample size, and are more appropriate 
for interpreting the significance of enormous sample sizes.  However, in smaller samples, the 
Leamer-Schwarz critical value is extremely conservative, and the usual critical values are 
more appropriate for interpretation. 
4.6 Results 
 At the state level, many allowed amounts decrease when caps on noneconomic 
damages are enacted.  State level estimates of the effect of implementing a damage cap on 
the allowed amount for Ob-Gyn procedures are reported in Table 4.3A.  Each column of 
Table 4.3A reports results from a separate regression for the allowed amount for a specific 
procedure.  Left to right the procedures reported are: c-section, vaginal birth, transvaginal 
ultrasound, and abdominal ultrasound in the first trimester.  The table only reports the effect 
of the cap and the constant term, estimates of the effects of control variables and fixed 
                                                          
39 The above identification strategies are incapable of identifying anticipation effects, and as such I 
underestimate the effect of a cap on the price of medical services. 
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effects are suppressed.40  The first row gives the estimated effect of the cap in log points, 
followed by the robust standard error clustered at the state level in the second row.  The 
third row gives the percent change in the price as a result of the cap.  The allowed amount 
for a vaginal birth, transvaginal ultrasound and abdominal ultrasound in the first trimester all 
show a negative and significant reaction to the implementation of a cap on non-economic 
damages.  There was not a significant effect on the allowed amount for a c-section, but the 
estimate is suggestively negative. 
 Table 4.3B reports estimates of the effect of implementing a damage cap on several 
non-Ob-Gyn procedures.  The layout of Table 4.3B is identical to the layout of Table 4.3A, 
with the exception of the procedures reported.  From left to right the procedures are: 
CABG, chest x-ray, 15 minute office visit, and tetanus shot.  Only the estimates for the 
allowed amount for a CABG surgery and a tetanus shot show a negative and significant 
reaction to the implementation of a cap on non-economic damages.  The effect on the 
allowed amount of a CABG surgery is much larger in magnitude than those estimated for 
Ob-Gyn procedures. 
 The decreases found at the state level in the allowed amounts are not found in the 
charged amounts.  The effect of a damage cap on the price charged by physicians to the 
insurance company is reported in Tables 4.4A and 4.4B.  Tables 4.4A and 4.4B are identical 
in layout to 4.3A and 4.3B.  The only result that shows up as statistically significant is that 
for 15 minute office visits.  This estimate is positive and should be disregarded, at the 
regression is run on a sample of over 250 million observations and while significant based on 
usual measures is not statistically significant based on the Leamer-Schwarz critical value.  All 
                                                          
40 Full regression results are available upon request. 
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other estimates show no effect of damage caps on the amount doctors submit to insurance 
companies. 
4.6.1. Urban vs Rural Differences 
 To further explore how price changes vary between urban and rural areas, I also 
estimate the following equation. 
   (4) 
Equation (4) is similar to equation (3), but has two variables of interest: , a dummy 
variable for if the state has a damage cap and the procedure was performed in an urban area, 
and , a dummy variable for if the state has a damage cap and the procedure was 
performed in a non-urban area.  The coefficients of interest  and  give the effect of a 
damage cap on procedures in urban and rural areas respectively.  In the above specification, 
the vector  does not include a dummy for whether the procedure was performed in an 
urban or rural location. 
Tables 4.5A and 4.5B report results from equation (4).  The first three rows show the 
effect of a cap on noneconomic damages on the allowed amounts in urban areas, and the 
next three rows show the effect in non-urban areas.41  The urban area estimates mirror the 
estimates for states as a whole reported in Tables 4.3A and 4.3B, but with slightly larger 
magnitudes.  Estimates for non-urban areas show no reaction to the implementation of 
damage caps.  This suggests that the effects found in Tables 4.3A and 4.3B are almost 
entirely driven by price changes in cities.   
                                                          
41 Results for charged amounts are available upon request. 
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4.6.2. City Level Estimates 
 An alternative approach to identification of the effect of the damage cap is to use 
variation within a given city.  I do this by restricting my sample to the 11 MSAs that cross 
the borders of the states that enacted caps after 2003 and estimating the following model. 
    (5) 
Equation (5) is similar to equation (3) with two differences, the new subscript  denotes 
MSA, and the state and year fixed effects have been replaced by a vector of MSA by 
year fixed effects.  This specification gains identification by comparing prices within the 
same MSA but on different sides of the state border.  This removes a great deal of variation 
that may be omitted in the previous state level analysis.  Because equation (5) controls for 
MSA specific trends, an omitted variable would need to change mid-year within an MSA 
while at the same time being correlated with both the price of medical services and the 
implementation of a damage cap to create bias.  Such omitted variables are far less likely to 
occur that the type of omitted variables that would bias equation (3).  The border model in 
equation (5) does have a major drawback: since the model is dependent on variation found 
exclusively in urban areas, the results may not generalize.  However, as shown in Tables 4.4A 
and 4.4B changes in the price are driven primarily by urban areas, so external validity (from 
the city to the state level) is not a big concern. 
 The cross border MSA analysis shows a much larger effect of implementing a 
damage cap.  Estimates of the effect of a damage cap on the allowed amount for procedures 
using MSAs that cross state borders are reported in Tables 4.6A and 4.6B.  Tables 4.6A and 
4.6B follow the same layout as Tables 4.3A and 4.3B, but specification (5) is now used and 
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standard errors are now clustered at the MSA level.  All of the effects are negative and much 
greater in magnitude than those estimated using state level variation. Only the estimate for 
the price of a CABG surgery is statistically insignificant, which may be an artifice of the 
sample size being severely reduced when transitioning from the state level to the MSA level 
for this procedure. 
Tables 4.7A and 4.7B report results for regressions where the charged amount is the 
dependent variable.  The estimates of the effect of damage caps on the amount charged by 
physicians are insignificant for procedures in the Ob-Gyn specialty.  The estimates for 
procedures not in the Ob-Gyn specialty are very different.  The non-Ob-Gyn procedures 
show negative and significant reductions in the amount charged, ranging from approximately 
one third the magnitude of the reduction in the allowed amount to approximately two thirds 
the magnitude of the reduction in the allowed amount. 
4.6.3.  Heterogeneous Effects on the Allowed Amount 
 It is possible that the effect of a damage cap on the allowed amount of a medical 
procedure may vary across its price distribution.  Physicians who have a higher price for their 
services may realize a greater (or smaller) percentage price reduction after a cap is enacted.  
To allow for this possibility I re-estimate equation (5) using quantile regression.  I am then 
able to observe what the effect of a damage cap is on each conditional quantile in the 
procedure allowed amount distribution.  The results of the quantile regressions are reported 
in Figures 4.2A for Ob-Gyn procedures and 4.2B for non-Ob-Gyn procedures. 
 For Ob-Gyn procedures there is a dip in the magnitude of the effect of a damage cap 
around the 60th percentile in the price distribution.  This suggests that Ob-Gyns who have 
prices at the high and low end of the distribution have larger effects on prices than those in 
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the middle.  The exception to this is c-sections, which show increasing price reductions as 
the quantile increases.  General procedures do not show any strong pattern, although there 
does appear to be a slight positive relationship between the size of the price reduction and 
quantile for chest x-rays. 
4.6.4. Falsification Test 
 One way to test the robustness of these estimates is to see if I can find an effect of 
caps that never happened.  If there are significant effects of nonexistent caps on the price of 
medical services, then the above results would be called into serious doubt.  To do this I 
omit the states that enacted caps from the analysis and test the effect of the enacting of three 
false caps in states that did not border states that enacted true caps on the price of services.  
I placed false caps in New York and Washington in 2005, and Nevada in 2004.  These caps 
correspond to true caps enacted in Georgia and South Carolina in 2005, and in Illinois in 
2004. 
The effect of the false caps is reported in Table 4.8A for Ob-Gyn procedures, and 
Table 4.8B for non-Ob-Gyn procedures.  Tables 4.8A and 4.8B have the same layout and 
specification as Tables 4.3A and 4.3B, but use false caps instead of real caps, and do not 
report percent changes in their allowed amounts.  Not only is there is no significant effect 
for any of the procedures, but with the exception of 15 minute office visits, all of the 
standard errors are larger than the estimates. 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
 My analysis shows a relationship between caps on non-economic damages and the 
pricing of treatments by physicians, providing strong evidence that malpractice risk is passed 
through at least to insurance companies and possibly to consumers.  My estimates are in 
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some cases even larger than the effects of defensive medicine on expenditures found by 
Kessler and McClellan (1996).  This raises the question of whether quantity effects (which 
may be defensive medicine) of medical malpractice risk are as large in magnitude as price 
effects.  Further work would need to estimate both effects in tandem to satisfactorily answer 
this question.  
Damage caps have a much larger effect on the allowed amount of a procedure than 
on the amount that a physician charges to the insurance company.  This suggests that the 
mechanism by which prices are reduced is through the bargaining game between physicians 
and insurers.  Non-Ob-Gyns are willing to decrease their charged amounts slightly in 
response to a cap, and the full extent of the market price reduction is felt after the insurance 
company decides how much it is willing to reimburse.  This is exacerbated with Ob-Gyns, 
who appear to be unwilling (or possibly unable) to decide to charge less after a damage cap is 
implemented, and all of the market price reduction comes from the insurance company. 
There does not appear to be a consistent link between the risk inherent in a 
particular procedure, and that procedure’s price sensitivity to damage caps.  For Ob-Gyns, 
birthing is the most risky procedure performed, but the price of ultrasounds is far more 
sensitive to the implementation of damage caps than the price of birthing.  It is possible that 
Ob-Gyns spread the cost of the risk inherent in practice in general across the pricing of all 
procedures. 
Overall, this work shows that the prices of medical services respond to changes in 
the strength of the malpractice liability system.  The implementation of damage caps yields 
sizable reductions in the cost of some procedures, especially for those procedures in the Ob-
Gyn field or for risky procedures such as CABG surgery.  The costs savings from damage 
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caps may in fact be quite sizable.  For example, based on my results the cost savings from a 
caps’ price reduction for office visits alone in the state of Illinois in a single year comes to 
just over $7.5 million.  For all 8 procedures estimated that number grows to almost $11.7 
million.  Further study of all medical procedures in the United States would be needed to 
know which procedures are price responsive, and which are not. 
Finally, the estimated effect of caps does not mean that the same result would 
necessarily be felt if such caps were implemented in uncapped states or at a national level, as 
uncapped states may have smaller shares of malpractice risk being passed on to consumers.  
That is to say that states which pass caps may be self-selected on the proportion of prices 
which are attributed to malpractice risk pass through.   
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Appendices 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Appendix 3:  Asset Value Calculations 
 
Asset Value (Table 3.5) Generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5, Column 2 – 
Average of Settlements 
within 3 years for given age 
group 
Table 3.5, Column 3 – 
Estimated policy effect from 
Table 3.2, set equal to zero if 
not significant 
Table 3.5, Column 4 – 
Estimated policy effect from 
Table 3.3, set equal to zero if 
insignificant, multiplied by 
estimated effect of cash 
demanded in Table 3.3 
     
     
  
Table 3.5, Column 6 – 
Column 4 multiplied by 
estimate from Table 3.4 
Table 3.5, Column 7 – Sum 
of columns 2, 3 and 4, 
adjusted for change in timing 
of payment in Table 3.6 
 
Table 3.5, Column 8 – divide 
column 7 by column 1. 
Multiply by negative 1 
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Alternate Asset Value (Table 3.7) generation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.7, Column 1 – Same as 
Table 3.5, Column 8 
Table 3.7, Column 2 – Uses median techniques, generated using same 
logic as Table 3.5, the differences are: 
• Column 2 of Table 3.5 uses the median settlement amount 
            
Table 7, Column 2 – Uses MEQ techniques, generated using same logic 
as Table 3.5, the differences are: 
• Column 2 of Table 3.5 uses the MEQ settlement amount 
• Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3.5 come from MEQ regressions 
(MEQ’s vary based on age group) 
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Figure 2.1:  Bid-Functions for Several Income and Taste Classes – Before and After 
the Top 10% Plan 
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Figure 2.2:  Average Housing Price by School Quality (ACT Quintiles) 
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Figure 2.3:  Bottom Two Quintiles of School District Quality –Percent Growth in 
Home Values 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Bottom Two Quintiles of School District Quality –Percent Growth in 
Home Values for Non-monopolistic Counties 
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Figure 3.1:  Minimum Acceptable Settlements for Two Risk Preferences 
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Figure 3.2:  Density Plot of Years to Settlement and Years to Verdict 
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Figure 3.3:  Survival Function of Medical Malpractice Cases 
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Figure 3.4:  Effect of Policy on Settlement Amount Conditional Quantiles 
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Figure 3.5:  Effect of Policy on Cash Demanded Conditional Quantiles 
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Figure 4.1:  Average Allowed Amount for an Abdominal Ultrasound  
(1st Trimester) 
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Figure 4.2A:  Allowed Quantile Regression Results Ob-Gyn Procedures - Cross 
Border MSAs  
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Figure 4.2B:  Market Price Quantile Regression Results Ob-Gyn Procedures - Cross 
Border MSAs  
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Table 2.1:  Descriptive Statistics - Means and Standard Deviations 
  
School Quality Quintiles Based on ACT Scores 
Both 2nd Quintile 1st Quintile 
Subsample (Control) (Treatment) 
Dependent Variables 
Average Home Value (in 
thousands) 
38.47 35.18 41.96 
(26.49) (24.93) (27.63) 
High School Demographics 
Percent Minority Students 
0.690 0.514 0.876 
(0.240) (0.177) (0.136) 
Percent Disadvantaged Students 
0.571 0.466 0.682 
(0.187) (0.137) (0.167) 
Percent Gifted Students 
0.094 0.094 0.093 
(0.067) (0.069) (0.065) 
Average Teacher Experience 
12.641 12.659 12.623 
(2.515) (2.467) (2.565) 
Teacher Student Ratio 
13.046 12.300 13.835 
(3.291) (3.249) (3.148) 
Urbanization Characteristics 
Percent in a Town 
0.222 0.228 0.215 
(0.415) (0.420) (0.411) 
Percent in a Small Fringe 
0.061 0.066 0.056 
(0.239) (0.248) (0.229) 
Percent in a Large Fringe 
0.041 0.057 0.025 
(0.199) (0.232) (0.155) 
Percent in a Small City 
0.120 0.080 0.162 
(0.325) (0.271) (0.369) 
Percent in a Large City 
0.228 0.115 0.348 
(0.420) (0.320) (0.476) 
Percent in a Rural Area 
0.328 0.454 0.195 
(0.469) (0.498) (0.396) 
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Table 2.1:  Descriptive Statistics - Means and Standard Deviations (continued) 
 
School Quality Quintiles Based on ACT Scores 
Both 2nd Quintile 1st Quintile 
Subsample (Control) (Treatment) 
County Level Characteristics 
Percent Black 
0.092 0.100 0.084 
(0.420) (0.079) (0.085) 
Percent Hispanic 
0.427 0.299 0.563 
(0.269) (0.189) (0.274) 
Persons per Housing Unit 
2.848 2.730 2.972 
(0.321) (0.246) (0.343) 
Percent Owner Occupied 
0.682 0.703 0.660 
(0.092) (0.092) (0.085) 
Violent Crimes (per 1,000 People) 
0.017 0.017 0.018 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) 
Percent with College Degree 
0.172 0.170 0.174 
(0.075) (0.077) (0.072) 
Observations (school-by-year) 5,650 2,910 2,740 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  Average value per unit is reported in real terms of 
1990 dollars.  1st quintile (treatment group) is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based 
on pre-policy ACT Scores.  2nd quintile (control group) is defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school 
quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.   
Sources: Texas Comptroller Property Tax Division (TCPTD), 1995 to 2006; Academic Excellence 
Indicator System (AEIS), Texas Education Agency (TEA), 1994-95 to 2005-06; National Center for 
Education Statistics (NCES), 1994-95 to 2005-06;  U.S. Census Bureau Decennial Census, 1990 and 2000; 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) database, 1995 to 2006. 
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Table 2.2:  Difference-in-Differences School Quality Quintiles Based on ACT Scores 
 
Panel A: Average Price of Residential 
Homes (in thousands)  
2nd ACT Quintile 1st ACT Quintile 
 (Control) (Treatment) Difference 
Pre Policy (1994/95 - 1996/97) 31.26 35.91 4.65 
Post Policy (1997/98 - 2005/06) 36.93 43.76 6.83 
Difference 5.66 7.84 2.18 
 
Panel B: Log Average Price of Residential 
Homes  
2nd ACT Quintile 1st ACT Quintile 
 (Control) (Treatment) Difference 
Pre Policy (1994/95 - 1996/97) 10.184 10.329 0.145 
Post Policy (1997/98 - 2005/06) 10.310 10.484 0.174 
Difference 0.125 0.155 0.029 
Notes: Average price of residential homes is reported in real terms of 1990 dollars.  1st quintile (treatment 
group) is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  2nd 
quintile (control group) is defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT 
Scores. 
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Table 2.3:  Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Log Average Price of Residential 
Homes (Bottom Two ACT Quintiles of School Quality) 
 
Log Average Price (1990 Dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x Treatment 
0.032** 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Treatment  
(1st ACT quintile) 
0.153*** -0.087* -0.044 -0.060 
(0.052) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) 
Post (year after 1996-97) 
-0.036*** -0.040*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Linear Trend 
0.027*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 
10.122*** 9.616*** 8.545*** 8.439*** 
(0.035) (0.129) (0.257) (0.297) 
Controls: 
High School 
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization No Yes Yes Yes 
County Level No No Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 5,650 5,650 5,650 5,650 
R2  0.04 0.71 0.77 0.78 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  1st quintile 
(treatment group) is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  
2nd quintile (control group) is defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school quality based on pre-policy 
ACT Scores.    ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.4:  Difference-in-Differences Regressions - All ACT Quintiles of School 
Quality 
 
Log Average Price (1990 Dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x 2nd ACT quintile 
-0.102*** -0.098*** -0.078*** -0.077*** 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
Post x 3rd ACT quintile 
-0.079*** -0.085*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
Post x 4th ACT quintile 
-0.034* -0.039* -0.025 -0.024 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019) 
Post x 5th ACT quintile 
-0.005 -0.032 -0.024 -0.023 
(0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.017) 
2nd ACT quintile  
(20-40%) 
-0.173*** -0.040 -0.052 -0.043 
(0.050) (0.040) (0.034) (0.034) 
3rd ACT quintile  
(40-60%) 
-0.272*** -0.057 -0.071* -0.067* 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.041) (0.040) 
4th ACT quintile  
(60-80%) 
-0.023 0.005 -0.012 -0.006 
(0.047) (0.056) (0.046) (0.045) 
5th ACT quintile  
(80-100%) 
0.420*** 0.211*** 0.147*** 0.156*** 
(0.050) (0.064) (0.053) (0.051) 
Post (year after 1996-97) 
0.029* 0.031* 0.026* 0.026* 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
Linear Trend 
0.033*** 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 
10.283*** 10.159*** 9.024*** 9.054*** 
(0.035) (0.129) (0.189) (0.202) 
Controls: 
High School Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization No Yes Yes Yes 
County Level No No Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 13,943 13,943 13,943 13,943 
R2 0.19 0.67 0.74 0.75 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  1st quintile 
is the omitted category and is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy 
ACT Scores.  ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.5:  Placebo Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Top Two ACT Quintiles 
of School Quality 
 
Log Average Price (1990 Dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x Placebo Treatment 
-0.028** 0.005 0.007 0.005 
(0.013) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Placebo Treatment  
(4th ACT quintile) 
-0.443*** -0.134*** -0.087*** -0.095*** 
(0.047) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032) 
Post (year after 1996-97) 
0.001 -0.057*** -0.051*** -0.050*** 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Linear Trend 
0.037*** 0.061*** 0.049*** 0.050*** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 
10.696*** 10.471*** 9.838*** 9.945*** 
(0.035) (0.117) (0.325) (0.325) 
Controls: 
High School 
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization No Yes Yes Yes 
County Level No No Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 5,491 5,491 5,491 5,491 
R2  0.19 0.66 0.73 0.74 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  4th quintile 
(placebo treatment) is defined as the upper middle fifth (60-80%) of school quality based on pre-policy 
ACT Scores.  5th quintile (placebo control) is defined as the top (80-100%) of school quality based on pre-
policy ACT Scores.    ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.   
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Table 2.6:  Pre-policy Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Parallel Trends 
Assumption Test 
 
Log Average Price (1990 Dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fake Post x Treatment 
-0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Treatment (1st ACT 
quintile) 
0.154*** -0.021 0.013 -0.006 
(0.052) (0.050) (0.048) (0.050) 
Fake Post (year is 1995-96) 
-0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Linear Trend 
-0.003 0.006** 0.005 0.003 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constant 
10.184*** 9.691*** 8.585*** 8.596*** 
(0.036) (0.155) (0.319) (0.371) 
Controls: 
High School Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization No Yes Yes Yes 
County Level No No Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416 
R2  0.02 0.72 0.76 0.77 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  Years of 
analysis are 1994-95, 1995-96, and 1996-97 (pre-policy data).  1st quintile (treatment group) is defined as 
the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  2nd quintile (control group) is 
defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  ***, **, * 
indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 2.7:  Alternative Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Excluding No Child 
Left Behind (NCLB) School Years 
  
Log Average Price (1990 Dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Full Sample:  8-Year Window: 6-Year Window: 
1994-95 to 2005-06 1994-95 to 2001-02 1994-95 to 1999-00 
(3 Yrs Pre, 9 Yrs 
Post) 
(3 Yrs Pre, 5 Yrs 
Post) 
(3 Yrs Pre, 3 Yrs 
Post) 
Post x Treatment 
0.049*** 0.032** 0.025** 
(0.016) (0.013) (0.011) 
Treatment  
(1st ACT quintile) 
-0.060 -0.034 -0.019 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Post  
(year after 1996-97) 
-0.031*** -0.023** 0.004 
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Linear Trend 
0.034*** 0.032*** 0.023*** 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 
8.439*** 8.389*** 8.486*** 
(0.297) (0.311) (0.325) 
Controls: 
High School 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization Yes Yes Yes 
County Level Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 5,650 3,782 2,837 
R2  0.78 0.77 0.77 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  1st quintile 
(treatment group) is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  
2nd quintile (control group) is defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school quality based on pre-policy 
ACT Scores.    ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 2.8:  Difference-in-Differences Regressions by Grade Spans 3rd to 8th Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) in 
Reading, Math, & Writing (RM&W) Pass Rate 
 
3rd Grade: 4th Grade: 5th Grade: 6th Grade: 7th Grade: 8th Grade: 
TAAS RM&W TAAS RM&W TAAS RM&W TAAS RM&W TAAS RM&W TAAS RM&W 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Post x 4th ACT 
quintile 
 -3.08 -1.94 -3.35 -4.41 
 [2.241] [2.423] [2.556] [2.757] 
Post x 3rd ACT 
quintile 
2.40 0.23 12.86 11.58 3.17 2.54 6.97 5.42 -1.88 -2.62 -2.47 -6.05 
[4.245] [5.858] [6.102]* [6.942]+ [2.741] [3.757] [2.462]** [3.207]+ [2.174] [2.452] [2.402] [2.716]* 
Post x 2nd ACT 
quintile 
-2.16 -3.25 8.40 5.24 5.91 5.51 7.57 5.06 -0.77 -1.03 -3.30 -5.98 
[4.139] [5.655] [5.984] [6.715] [2.770]* [3.566] [2.493]** [3.207] [1.972] [2.206] [2.444] [2.690]* 
Post x 1st ACT 
quintile 
8.70 6.48 11.45 6.35 16.23 14.76 13.22 10.22 6.47 4.18 3.13 -2.35 
[4.798]+ [6.126] [6.680]+ [7.072] [3.880]** [4.526]** [3.382]** [4.098]* [2.505]* [2.690] [2.957] [3.101] 
Constant 
73.26 61.84 68.23 76.50 76.23 70.30 77.49 75.19 85.11 92.31 67.64 62.92 
[5.591]** [16.481]** [6.233]** [14.046]** [3.042]** [11.417]** [6.300]** [11.036]** [1.631]** [7.697]** [2.520]** [8.317]** 
Controls: 
Quintile 
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
High School No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
School District 
Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Obs (school-by-
year) 936 936 952 952 965 965 1,189 1,189 2,245 2,245 2,263 2,263 
R2  0.14 0.49 0.16 0.57 0.26 0.58 0.27 0.58 0.32 0.60 0.20 0.56 
Notes: Numbers in brakets are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  1st quintile is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%), 2nd quintile is 
defined as the lower middle (20-40%), 3rd quintile is defined as the middle (40-60%), 4th quintile is defined as the upper middle (60-80%), and 5th quintile 
(omitted category) is defined as the top fifth (80-100%).  **, *, + indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.9:  Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Robin Hood Plan 
 
Dependent Variable - Log Spending Per Pupil 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x Treatment 
-0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Treatment (1st ACT quintile) 
-0.051** -0.016 -0.013 -0.005 
(0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Post (year after 1996-97) 
0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Linear Trend 
0.05*** 0.04*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 
8.326*** 9.017*** 8.782*** 8.753*** 
(0.017) (0.044) (0.118) (0.141) 
Controls: 
School  No Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization No Yes Yes Yes 
County No No Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 4,257 4,257 4,257 4,257 
R2 0.22 0.69 0.70 0.71 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  1st quintile 
(treatment group) is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  
2nd quintile (control group) is defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school quality based on pre-policy 
ACT Scores.    ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 2.10:  Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Excluding Longhorn 
Scholarship Eligible High Schools 
 
Log Average Price (1990 Dollars) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post x Treatment 
0.029* 0.037*** 0.040** 0.039** 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) 
Treatment  
(1st ACT quintile) 
0.075 -0.084* -0.036 -0.054 
(0.054) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047) 
Post (year after 1996-97) 
-0.027*** -0.025** -0.020* -0.018* 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Linear Trend 
0.024*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 
10.115*** 9.620*** 8.571*** 8.417*** 
(0.036) (0.136) (0.264) (0.302) 
Controls: 
High School 
Demographics No Yes Yes Yes 
Urbanization No Yes Yes Yes 
County No No Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No No No Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 5,164 5,164 5,164 5,164 
R2 0.02 0.70 0.76 0.77 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  1st quintile 
(treatment group) is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  
2nd quintile (control group) is defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school quality based on pre-policy 
ACT Scores.    ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 2.11:  Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Schooling Market Power 
 
Log Avg. Price 
(1990 Dollars) 
Post x Treatment x HHI 
-0.171** 
(0.070) 
Post x Treatment 
0.058*** 
(0.022) 
Post x HHI 
-0.218*** 
(0.047) 
Treatment x HHI 
0.226* 
(0.131) 
Post (year after 1996-97) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
Treatment (1st ACT quintile) 
-0.073 
(0.055) 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
-0.073 
(0.084) 
Linear Trend 
0.035*** 
(0.002) 
Constant 
8.719*** 
(0.263) 
Controls: 
High School Demographics Yes 
Urbanization Yes 
County Level Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects Yes 
Obs (school-by-year) 5,650 
R2  0.77 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  Schooling 
market power is mesured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) per pupils.  1st quintile (treatment group) 
is defined as the bottom fifth (0-20%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.  2nd quintile 
(control group) is defined as the lower middle (20-40%) of school quality based on pre-policy ACT Scores.    
***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.12:  Diff-in-Diff Regression Subsamples by County Schooling Market Power 
 
Log Average Price (1990 Dollars) 
1st 
Quintile 
HHI: 
2nd 
Quintile 
HHI: 
3rd 
Quintile 
HHI: 
4th 
Quintile 
HHI: 
5th 
Quintile 
HHI: 
(Least 
Monopolistic)  
(Most 
Monopolistic) 
Post x Treatment 
0.034* -0.012 -0.043 -0.079 -0.009 
(0.019) (0.048) (0.039) (0.058) (0.070) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs (school-by-
year) 3,133 818 923 532 244 
R2 0.72 0.57 0.58 0.51 0.61 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered by high school campus ID.  Schooling 
market power is mesured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) per pupils.  Each coefficient represents a 
separate regression of the log average price (in 1990 Dollars) or log number of housing units on a constant, 
post indicator, treatment indicator, post*treatment indicator, and a linear time trend, controlling for high 
school demographics, urbanization, and county level characteristics.  ***, **, * indicates statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
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Table 3.1:  Summary Statistics 
Variable Name 
Settled Within 3 
Years 
Universe of Settled 
Claims 
Before 
Reform 
After 
Reform 
Before 
Reform 
After 
Reform 
Settlement Amount (Thousands) 
471.64 212.79 420.33 228.63 
(1,152.18) (577.29) (958.01) (530.99) 
Cash Demanded (Thousands) 
530.05 249.74 516.69 259.07 
(1,310.77) (756.15) (1,322.53) (703.95) 
Duration of Case (Days) 
837.81  632.96  1,597.17  896.61  
(188.78) (257.39) (897.89) (618.44) 
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 
91.37 74.89 79.19 81.69 
(151.64) (134.13) (160.45) (135.21) 
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 
1,223.17 1,602.66 999.16 1,390.35 
(2,101.66) (2,087.11) (2,241.30) (1,989.05) 
Age of Injured Party (Years) 
42.62 41.02 38.09 41.17 
(24.85) (26.61) (25.27) (26.12) 
Injured Party was a Baby (Binary) 
0.11 0.17 0.17 0.16 
(0.32) (0.37) (0.38) (0.37) 
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 
0.63 0.27 0.76 0.33 
(1.07) (0.72) (1.32) (0.77) 
Other Health Care Providers Defending 
(Binary) 
0.27 0.13 0.37 0.16 
(0.91) (0.51) (1.56) (0.58) 
Observations 4,358 1,772 17,660 2,702 
Note: All dollar values are scaled to year 2000 dollars 
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Table 3.2:  OLS Regression Results - Settlment Amount for Cases Settled Within 3 Years (Thousands) 
Age Group 0 to 2 3 to 19 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 All Ages 
After Policy Change (Binary) 
-105.68 -4.95 -111.11*** -103.40*** -47.59 -25.00 -23.16 -59.10*** 
(69.63) (63.84) (40.19) (35.54) (39.92) (18.20) (31.77) (16.15) 
Cash Demanded (Thousands) 
0.74*** 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.56*** 0.61*** 0.55*** 0.64*** 0.61*** 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.10) (0.16) (0.06) 
Initial Indemnity Reserve 
(Thousands) 
0.46 0.29 0.60*** 0.61** 0.84** 0.24 0.41** 0.46*** 
(0.32) (0.19) (0.16) (0.29) (0.41) (0.16) (0.18) (0.12) 
Per Accident Policy Limit 
(Thousands) 
0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Other Physicians Defending 
(Binary) 
87.03* 99.57** 147.49*** 35.14 108.11*** 76.17*** 18.63 72.85*** 
(49.68) (43.46) (53.48) (31.59) (33.25) (19.04) (21.55) (13.87) 
Other Health Care Providers 
Defending (Binary) 
150.56 57.72 -4.48 103.25** -42.00 125.59** 35.08 39.21** 
(110.26) (48.23) (10.69) (50.77) (37.70) (52.24) (23.87) (16.93) 
Constant 
143.63** 60.86 98.84*** 34.58 -43.35 43.99** 31.92 175.75*** 
(71.57) (98.45) (29.17) (30.85) (71.07) (17.93) (54.54) (42.88) 
Age 
(5.63) *** 
(1.53) 
Age Squared 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Observations 840 373 598 939 871 852 691 6,130 
R-squared 0.470 0.647 0.377 0.640 0.660 0.823 0.696 0.575 
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, *** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and constant reported in thousands, robust standard errors in 
parenthesis 
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Table 3.3:  OLS Regression Results - Cash Demanded for Cases Settled Within 3 Years (Thousands) 
Age Group 0 to 2 3 to 19 20 to 29 30 to 39 40 to 49 50 to 59 60 to 69 All Ages 
After Policy Change (Binary) 
-195.69** -138.65 35.44 -312.90*** -341.75*** -119.37** -205.40*** -193.82*** 
(85.52) (168.80) (114.81) 65.40 (152.61) (45.94) (36.41) (27.29) 
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 
2.70*** 1.59 1.27*** 2.19*** 2.58** 0.78* 1.70* 1.97*** 
(0.73) (0.96) (0.30) 0.75 (1.00) (0.44) (0.98) (0.34) 
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 
0.20*** 0.04 -0.01 0.07** 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.04** 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 
87.42 223.61** 187.75*** 159.07** 227.33*** 188.13*** 93.46*** 162.49*** 
(53.55) (99.83) (498.34) (69.99) (68.18) (45.13) (33.12) (20.78) 
Other Health Care Providers Defending 
(Binary) 
293.74*** -22.54 13.39 49.14 -22.17 505.83*** -34.71 113.07** 
(111.73) (91.88) (21.29) (67.38) (68.51) (156.80) (43.21) (43.85) 
Constant 
103.33 184.62 184.90*** 187.90 149.63 148.58** 220.89*** 300.06*** 
(97.46) (112.33) (37.72) (58.36) (152.61) (60.27) (66.99) (47.63) 
Age 
(3.78) ** 
1.89 
Age Squared 
0.01 
(0.02) 
Observations 840 373 598 939 871 852 691 6,130 
R-squared 0.209 0.138 0.100 0.122 0.136 0.245 0.113 0.123 
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, *** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and constant reported in thousands, robust standard errors in 
parenthesis 
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Table 3.4:  Duration Results - Cox Proportional Hazard, Cases Settled Within 3 Years 
Hazard Ratio 
Age Group After Policy Change 
0 to 2 
2.450*** 
(0.213) 
3 to 19 
2.253*** 
(0.284) 
20 to 29 
1.971*** 
(0.244) 
30 to 39 
1.994*** 
(0.192) 
40 to 49 
2.051*** 
(0.199) 
50 to 59 
1.902*** 
(0.169) 
60 to 69 
1.777*** 
(0.196) 
All Ages 
2.006*** 
(0.072) 
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, *** denotes P < 0.01, other regression coeffecients supressed 
(available upon request), Cash Demanded does not statistically influence duration 
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Table 3.5:  Effect of Reform on Quick Settlements, Cases Settled Within 3 Years (All Dollar Values in Thousands) 
Age Group 
Average 
Settlement 
Pre-Reform 
Estimated Effect 
of Reform on 
Settlement 
Amount 
Estimated Effect 
of Reform via 
Cash Demanded 
Pre-Reform 
Average Time 
to Payment 
(Days) 
Estimated 
Change in Time 
to Payment 
(Days) 
Difference in 
Settlement's 
Asset Value 
Percent of 
Original 
Value Lost 
0 to 2 784.29 0.00 -144.81 832.18 -492.51 -132.61 16.91 
3 to 19 436.84 0.00 0.00 818.47 -455.19 7.69 -1.76 
20 to 29 409.37 -111.11 0.00 840.21 -413.92 -106.34 25.98 
30 to 39 469.34 -103.40 -175.22 844.61 -421.03 -275.52 58.70 
40 to 49 532.87 0.00 -208.47 843.21 -432.09 -203.05 38.10 
50 to 59 433.06 0.00 -65.65 854.88 -405.42 -59.89 13.83 
60 to 69 381.37 0.00 -131.46 836.17 -365.62 -127.93 33.54 
All Ages 471.64 -59.10 -118.23 837.81 -420.16 -172.54 36.58 
Note: All dollar values are scaled to year 2000 dollars, calculations assume a real interest rate of 0.0141.  Estimated effect amounts generated using Tables 3.2, 
3.3, and 3.4, statistically insignificant results reported as zeroes. Estimated effect on settlement amount is the after policy effect from Table 3.2.  Estimated effect 
via Cash Demanded is the effect of Cash Demanded from Table 3.2 multiplied by the after policy effect from Table 3.3.  Estimated change in time to payment is 
the inverse of the hazard from Table 3.4 multiplied by average pre-reform time to payment. 
 
104 
 
Table 3.6:  Maximum Entropy Quantiles 
Age Group MEQ 
0 to 2 62 
3 to 19 62 
20 to 29 45 
30 to 39 35 
40 to 49 43 
50 to 59 52 
60 to 69 49 
All Ages 43 
 
 
Table 3.7:  Effect of Reform on Asset Value, Cases Settled Within 3 Years 
Percent of Asset Value Lost 
Age Group OLS Median MEQ 
0 to 2 16.91 5.76 5.34 
3 to 19 -1.76 23.08 26.96 
20 to 29 25.98 29.14 25.73 
30 to 39 58.70 27.59 22.34 
40 to 49 38.10 35.69 26.79 
50 to 59 13.83 30.29 28.73 
60 to 69 33.54 25.37 23.47 
All Ages 36.58 29.76 22.94 
Note: All dollar values are scaled to year 2000 dollars, calculations assume a real interest rate of 0.0141.  
OLS results taken from Table 3.5.  Median and MEQ columns replicate Table 3.5 using median or MEQ 
settlement amounts and Median or MEQ regression. 
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Table 3.8: OLS Regression Results - Settlement Amount (Thousands) - Maximum 
Time to Settlement Sensitivity 
Age Group 3.5 Years 3 years 
After Policy Change (Binary) 
-68.11*** -59.10*** 
(14.19) (16.15) 
Cash Demanded (Thousands) 
0.58*** 0.61*** 
(0.04) (0.06) 
Initial Indemnity Reserve (Thousands) 
0.35** 0.46*** 
(0.14) (0.12) 
Per Accident Policy Limit (Thousands) 
0.02* 0.01 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 
57.85*** 72.85*** 
(10.40) (13.87) 
Other Health Care Providers Defending 
(Binary) 
39.34*** 39.21** 
(12.22) (16.93) 
Constant 
164.07*** 175.75*** 
(31.68) (42.88) 
Age 
-4.30*** -5.63*** 
(1.18) (1.53) 
Age Squared 
0.03** 0.04*** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Observations 9120 6,130 
R-squared 0.549 0.575 
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, *** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and constant 
reported in thousands, robust standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 3.9:  OLS Regression Results - Cash Demanded (Thousands) - Maximum 
Time to Settlement Sensitivity 
Age Group 3.5 Years 3 Years 
After Policy Change (Binary) 
-204.98*** -193.82*** 
(43.81) (27.29) 
Initial Indemnity Reserve 
(Thousands) 
2.43*** 1.97*** 
(0.39) (0.34) 
Per Accident Policy Limit 
(Thousands) 
0.05*** 0.04** 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Other Physicians Defending (Binary) 
137.72*** 162.49*** 
(18.00) (20.78) 
Other Health Care Providers 
Defending (Binary) 
67.93** 113.07** 
(29.01) (43.85) 
Constant 
285.95*** 300.06*** 
(43.81) (47.63) 
Age 
-4.32*** -3.78** 
(1.56) 1.89 
Age Squared 
0.02 0.01 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Observations 9120 6,130 
R-squared 0.153 0.123 
Note: * denotes P < 0.1, **  denotes P < 0.5, *** denotes P < 0.01, effect of binary variables and constant 
reported in thousands, robust standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 4.1.  Summary Statistics 
 
Mean 
Allowed 
Std. 
Deviation 
Mean 
Charge 
Std. 
Deviation Observations HMO PPO POS Urban 
Ob-Gyn Procedures 
Cesarean Section 2180.44 674.07 3334.18 1238.18 552,113 0.099 0.279 0.256 0.938 
Vaginal Birth 2008.83 573.35 2871.10 1039.31 1,112,030 0.113 0.281 0.238 0.928 
Transvaginal Ultrasound (Not Pregnant) 99.33 64.86 207.28 121.37 4,713,055 0.086 0.286 0.236 0.948 
Abdominal Ultrasound (1st Trimester) 115.55 67.47 210.72 117.10 922,141 0.081 0.263 0.260 0.951 
Non Ob-Gyn Procedures 
Single Coronary Artery Bypass Graft 1756.19 2120.38 4139.88 2899.56 6,919 0.085 0.287 0.117 0.927 
Chest X-Ray 29.47 29.11 55.48 59.69 20,573,408 0.091 0.300 0.383 0.900 
15 Minute Office Visit 52.92 27.21 75.07 433.58 257,882,996 0.093 0.299 0.200 0.897 
Tetanus Shot 24.69 21.80 38.73 68.53 3,987,883 0.151 0.312 0.211 0.927 
State Characteristics Mean Std. Deviation 
Number of Doctors (Thousands) 14.38 17.44 
Population (Thousands) 5538.99 6388.02 
Median Household Income (Thousands) 38.08 11.98 
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Table 4.2.  State Malpractice Tort Law Changes 2003 - 2007 
State Year Implemented Change in Tort System 
Florida 2003 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
Georgia 2005 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
Georgia 2005 Early Offer 
Illinois 2004 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
Montana 2003 Cap on Punitive Damages 
Ohio 2003 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
Oklahoma 2003 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
South Carolina 2005 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
Texas 2003 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
Washington 2006 Collateral Source Offset 
Wisconsin 2005 Cap Ruled Unconstituional 
Wisconsin 2006 Cap on Noneconomic Damages 
Note: shaded laws have no bearing on estimates of effect of a cap on noneconomic damages 
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Table 4.3A. Effect of Damage Cap on Log Allowed (Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 Cesarean Section Vaginal Birth 
Transvaginal 
Ultrasound  
(Not Pregnant) 
Abdominal 
Ultrasound 
(First Trimester) 
Effect of Cap 
-0.017 -0.021** -0.021* -0.072***° 
(0.014) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) 
Percent Change -1.669 -2.078 -2.095 -6.909 
Constant 
6.850***° 7.418***° 5.230***° 5.425***° 
(0.183) (0.221) (0.259) (0.461) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.087 0.109 0.255 0.188 
N 552,113 1,112,030 4,713,055 922,141 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level. 
 
Table 4.3B. Effect of Damage Cap on Log Allowed (Non-Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 
Coronary 
Artery Bypass 
Graft 
Chest X-Ray 15 Minute Office Visit Tetanus Shot 
Effect of Cap 
-0.129** -0.014 0.002 -0.068* 
(0.056) (0.013) (0.006) (0.035) 
Percent Change -12.103 -1.415 0.183 -6.570 
Constant 
10.698***° 3.337***° 4.303***° 2.357***° 
(1.446) (0.518) (0.235) (0.409) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.058 0.164 0.162 0.346 
N 6,919 20,573,408 257,882,996 3,987,883 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level. 
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Table 4.4A. Effect of Damage Cap on Log Charges (Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 Cesarean Section Vaginal Birth 
Transvaginal 
Ultrasound  
(Not Pregnant) 
Abdominal 
Ultrasound  
(First Trimester) 
Effect of Cap 
0.000 0.008 0.022 0.007 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.015) 
Percent Change 0.023 0.852 2.235 0.683 
Constant 
7.001***° 7.057***° 5.172***° 5.253***° 
(0.144) (0.158) (0.202) (0.297) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.167 0.211 0.161 0.156 
N 552,113 1,112,030 4,713,055 922,141 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level. 
 
Table 4.4B:  Effect of Damage Cap on Log Charges (Non-Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Chest X-Ray 
15 Minute 
Office Visit Tetanus Shot 
Effect of Cap 
0.013 0.021 0.009* -0.007 
(0.074) (0.032) (0.005) (0.007) 
Percent Change 1.313 2.143 0.904 -0.698 
Constant 
10.878***° 4.000***° 4.219***° 2.379***° 
(0.823) (0.313) (0.168) (0.305) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.126 0.080 0.142 0.402 
N 6,919 20,573,408 257,882,996 3,987,883 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level. 
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Table 4.5A:  Effect of Damage Cap on Urban/Rural Log Allowed  
(Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 Cesarean Section Vaginal Birth 
Transvaginal 
Ultrasound  
(Not Pregnant) 
Abdominal 
Ultrasound  
(First Trimester) 
Urban Effect of Cap 
-0.023 -0.026** -0.030* -0.077***° 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
Percent Change -2.274 -2.566 -2.955 -7.411 
Rural Effect of Cap 
0.053 0.032 0.085 -0.021 
(0.030) (0.024) (0.052) (0.055) 
Percent Change 5.443 2.429 8.872 -2.078 
Constant 
6.820***° 7.391***° 5.176***° 5.402***° 
(0.183) (0.219) (0.262) (0.466) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.088 0.109 0.255 0.188 
N 552,113 1,112,030 4,713,055 922,141 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level. 
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Table 4.5B:  Effect of Damage Cap on Urban/Rural Log Allowed  
(Non-Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Chest X-Ray 
15 Minute 
Office Visit Tetanus Shot 
Urban Effect of 
Cap 
-0.133** -0.023 0.000 -0.069* 
(0.055) (0.014) (0.006) (0.038) 
Percent Change -12.453 -2.274 0.000 -6.667 
Rural Effect of 
Cap 
-0.044 0.061 0.014 -0.054*** 
(0.106) (0.047) (0.015) (0.019) 
Percent Change -4.305 -5.918 1.410 -5.257 
Constant 
10.650***° 3.345***° 4.315***° 2.360***° 
(1.415) (0.510) (0.235) (0.395) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.058 0.164 0.162 0.346 
N 6,919 20,573,408 257,882,996 3,987,883 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level 
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Table 4.6A:  Effect of Damage Cap on Log Allowed (Ob-Gyn Procedures) -  
Cross Border MSAs 
 Cesarean Section Vaginal Birth 
Transvaginal 
Ultrasound 
(Not Pregnant) 
Abdominal 
Ultrasound  
(First Trimester) 
Effect of Cap 
-0.085** -0.074***° -0.097** -0.147** 
(0.035) (0.021) (0.042) (0.061) 
Percent Change -8.193 -7.136 -9.256 -13.687 
Constant 
6.815***° 7.073***° 5.054***° 4.204***° 
(0.216) (0.169) (0.211) (0.181) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
MSA by Year 
Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.062 0.068 0.108 0.163 
N 62,068 137,628 473,517 98,443 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
MSA level. 
 
Table 4.6B:  Effect of Damage Cap on Log Allowed (Non-Ob-Gyn Procedures) - 
Cross Border MSAs 
 
Coronary 
Artery Bypass 
Graft 
Chest X-Ray 15 Minute Office Visit 
Tetanus 
Shot 
Effect of Cap 
-0.217 -0.157***° -0.043** -0.142*** 
(0.201) (0.038) (0.014) (0.043) 
Percent Change -19.508 -14.551 -4.164 -13.206 
Constant 
6.484***° 1.484***° 3.042***° 4.141***° 
(1.451) (0.388) (0.097) (0.158) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
MSA by Year Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.121 0.159 0.194 0.136 
N 706 2,472,397 29,688,127 540,547 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
MSA level. 
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Table 4.7A:  Effect of Damage Cap on Log Charges (Ob-Gyn Procedures) -  
Cross Border MSAs 
 Cesarean Section 
Vaginal 
Birth 
Transvaginal 
Ultrasound  
(Not Pregnant) 
Abdominal 
Ultrasound  
(First Trimester) 
Effect of Cap 
-0.061 -0.033 -0.046 -0.051 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) 
Percent Change -5.872 -3.276 -4.538 -4.949 
Constant 
7.559***° 7.619***° 5.696***° 5.139***° 
(0.237) (0.147) (0.289) (0.184) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
MSA by Year Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.072 0.095 0.121 0.177 
N 62,068 137,628 473,517 98,443 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
MSA level 
 
Table 4.7B:  Effect of Damage Cap on Log Charges (Non-Ob-Gyn Procedures) - 
Cross Border MSAs 
 
Coronary Artery 
Bypass Graft Chest X-Ray 
15 Minute 
Office Visit Tetanus Shot 
Effect of Cap 
-0.150 -0.124*** -0.038* -0.049*** 
(0.095) (0.033) (0.021) (0.015) 
Percent Change -13.952 -11.662 -3.729 -4.782 
Constant 
5.842***° 2.851***° 3.925***° 4.655***° 
(0.974) (0.178) (0.068) (0.123) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
MSA by Year Fixed 
Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.200 0.110 0.206 0.167 
N 706 2,472,397 29,688,127 540,547 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
MSA level. 
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Table 4.8A:  Effect of False (Incorrect State) Damage Cap on Log Allowed  
(Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 
Cesarean 
Section Vaginal Birth 
Transvaginal 
Ultrasound 
(Not Pregnant) 
Abdominal 
Ultrasound  
(First Trimester) 
Effect of False Cap 
0.016 0.011 0.015 -0.019 
(0.160) (0.013) (0.018) (0.023) 
Constant 
6.814***° 7.351***° 5.054***° 5.283***° 
(0.183) (0.221) (0.224) (0.468) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.084 0.111 0.256 0.165 
N 488,529 965,451 4,231,626 652,608 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level. 
 
Table 4.8B:  Effect of False (Incorrect State) Damage Cap on Log Allowed  
(Non-Ob-Gyn Procedures) 
 
Coronary Artery 
Bypass Graft Chest X-Ray 
15 Minute Office 
Visit Tetanus Shot 
Effect of False Cap 
0.012 0.026 -0.022 -0.003 
(0.786) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) 
Constant 
10.492***° 3.207***° 4.314***° 2.089***° 
(1.533) (0.500) (0.234) (0.318) 
Controls YES YES YES YES 
State Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
R Squared 0.048 0.150 0.136 0.394 
N 6,089 18,057,457 226,717,775 3,463,383 
Notes: Rejection of a single tail test p<0.1 denoted *, p<0.05 denoted **, p<0.01 denoted ***.  Rejection of 
null based on Leamer-Schwarz critical value denoted °.  All standard errors are robust and clustered at the 
state level 
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